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Remote Hospitals and Hospital Value Based Purchasing
Nicole Adams
BS, ASN, MSN, PhD

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to identify remote hospitals and then assess their
performance in the first three years of the Hospital Value Based Purchasing program. A
definition for remote hospital was created using clinical outcome literature and travel
time. The hospitals were then identified as those hospitals more than 60 minutes driving
time from the next nearest hospital by using geographic information systems software
(n = 127). The remote hospitals’ payment adjustments and raw quality scores were be
compared with non-remote hospitals. Remote hospitals have done well in the first three
years improving their payments over time. However, little change is seen in the quality
metrics used in the program. A review of economic theories relevant to hospital
performance and behavior identified several hospital characteristics that may contribute
to performance. None of the characteristics were predictive of success in the program.
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Chapter 1: Research Proposal
Significance
The United States (US) spent $2.8 trillion on health care in 2012 which is
approximately 17.2% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services [CMS], 2014). Spending is projected to reach $3.1 trillion in 2014,
accounting for 18.3% of GDP. The US has ranked last or near last on every measure of
population health among developed nations as assessed by the World Health
Organization (WHO) every year since 2004 as cited by Davis et al (2014). Concerns
regarding the high level of spending with little return in terms of health outcomes have
created focused attention on the quality of healthcare in the US, especially since The
Institute of Medicine (IOM, 2001) published Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health
System for the 21st Century, which highlighted a lack of consistent quality in US

healthcare delivery.
Since 1960 hospital care has accounted for the largest percentage of US
healthcare spending; 32.1% in 2013 according to CMS. Hospital Value Based Purchasing
(HVBP) is a pay for performance program which is mandated by Congress in the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 and implemented by CMS to create financial
incentives for hospitals that improve the quality of their care and penalties for those that
fail to do so. All hospitals that receive Medicare payments through the Inpatient
Prospective Payment System (IPPS) are participants in the program. Hospitals designated
as Critical Access Hospitals (CAHs) are not part of the IPPS. (The Definitions section
(pp. 21) outlines specific details of CAHs and the IPPS).
The HVBP program creates a competitive environment in which each
participating hospital is ranked against all other participating hospitals nationwide.
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Hospitals ranked at the top receive a positive adjustment (a bonus) on subsequent
Medicare payments while lower ranking hospitals suffer a negative adjustment (a
penalty) on their payments from Medicare.
Previous research examining the relationship between the distance to health care
services and patient outcomes has defined greater than 100 miles as the longest travel
distance. Remote hospitals, defined here as IPPS hospitals that are more than 100 miles
away from the next IPPS hospital, are in a unique position because they have faced little
direct competition in the past due to their isolation. Especially in the Pacific Northwest,
Alaska, and the Southwest, many of these hospitals provide healthcare for American
Indian and Alaska Native reservations and communities. People served by these remote
hospitals already travel significant distances to receive care (Hart, Larson, & Lishner,
2005). Distance in and of itself can be a barrier to care for patients and may place an
untenable burden on family members of hospitalized patients (Agazio, 2003).
There are also remote hospitals which are too small to participate in the HVBP.
As the program changes from year to year smaller hospitals may lack sufficient case
numbers and therefore default back to standard Medicare payments. In the first year of
the program, 2986 hospitals were eligible for payment adjustments. For the second year
this number decreased by 256 to 2730. By the third year the number had increased to
3091. This raises numerous questions related to policy. Is the best outcome for these
hospitals to remain open without financial accountability for quality measures? What
would it mean for the community and the hospitals if these hospitals became Critical
Access Hospitals (CAHs)? Should there be a separate program for small hospitals, which
would include these remote hospitals, so that they can also be judged on quality? What
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would happen if these hospitals closed; how far would people have to travel for care?
How can access and quality be balanced in these sparsely populated regions? Can a
federal policy be created to apply to all hospitals creating equity in the face of such great
diversity of settings?
The ACA mandates that a small and rural hospital program be created two years
after enacting the law however, details for the program have not yet been announced by
CMS. The current HVBP program is being evaluated by CMS from a large scale
perspective without evaluating the impact on specific small groups of hospitals. Payment
adjustments, the top and bottom hospitals, and quality outcomes are being aggregated
nationally. This research seeks to analyze the performance of remote hospitals through
the lens of HVBP and the policy implications of this program for remote hospitals. As a
whole this project will create a template or model for evaluating other groups of hospitals
within the program.
Background
Quality of Healthcare
The first Federal agency focused on the quality of healthcare in the US was
created in 1989 as the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research by Congress and
housed within the department of Health and Human Services (HHS). It was renamed the
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) in 1999. The National Quality
Forum (NQF) was formed in 1999 as a non-profit non-partisan organization to advance
quality in healthcare. NQF works with CMS and AHRQ to help determine and implement
the use of quality measures by creating workgroups of experts and stakeholders from a
cross section of the healthcare industry. Both non-profit and for profit healthcare quality
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organizations have proliferated in recent years to provide education, accreditation, and
assistance to healthcare organizations seeking to improve quality and attain standards set
at the federal level.
Since 2003, AHRQ has published the National Healthcare Quality Report
(NHQR) annually. This report characterizes national trends in healthcare quality in the
form of Quality Indicators (QI) for processes of care and outcomes related to safety,
timeliness of care, readmissions, complication, deaths, use of medical imaging, patient
experience (satisfaction), volume of Medicare patients, and Medicare reimbursement.
Many of these QI measures have been incorporated in various pay for performance
programs for specified conditions such as acute myocardial infarction (AMI) and strokes.
Currently these data are submitted to the agency electronically by hospitals. In 2005
AHRQ launched its hospitalcompare.hhs.gov website to allow the public to review
aggregated QI for hospitals by zip code, city, or state.
In the private sector, The Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI) was founded
in 1991 as a not for profit organization that works in conjunction with other groups to
help identify and implement best practices on a national scale. The organization is best
known for their 100,000 Lives patient safety campaign and most recently their Triple
Aim campaign, which focuses on population health, individual experience, and cost
efficiency. IHI has also grown, becoming an international organization working towards
improved healthcare in nations around the world (IHI.org).
Over the past two decades, demonstration programs, voluntary programs, and
mandatory programs for quality reporting have become common in healthcare. CMS
introduced voluntary hospital quality reporting in 2003; beginning in 2004, hospitals
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were required to report data on a core set of measures in order to receive their annual
payment updates (Pham, Coughlan, & O’Malley, 2006). The effect of quality reporting
on care processes and patient outcomes has been studied both independently and in
conjunction with incentive payments. The research shows mixed results.
The first large scale quality reporting program for a specific procedure was the
New York State Cardiac Surgery Reporting System (CSRS) which began publishing
mortality rates for coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery for hospitals and
individual surgeons in NY state in 1991 (Jha & Epstein, 2006). At that time, there was
considerable concern that surgeons and hospitals would turn away sicker patients, or even
send them out of state, in order to improve their mortality rates (Steinbrook, 2006).
However, over the first dozen years of the program, in most cases mortality rates dropped
while out of state referrals decreased and the percent of high risk patients increased
(Chassin, 2002). Among limitations of this program, the only reported outcome is
mortality, and processes that potentially influence mortality are not captured (Chassin,
2002). Anecdotally, at least some of the hospitals with the greatest improvements in
quality made significant changes to their processes (Chassin, 2002). Steinbrook (2006)
pointed out that there is a risk for “gaming” of the system by assigning a higher risk score
to patients. For example, Epstein (2006) reported that almost half of the reduction in riskadjusted mortality in the initial years of the program could be attributed to an increase in
severity of illness coding (i.e., upcoding), but that has been difficult to substantiate due to
subsequent improvements in data auditing at the state level. Another weakness was that
the system was designed to capture patients that received CABG but not patients who
might have been candidates but were turned away due to high risk (Epstein, 2006).
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Epstein cited studies on high risk patient avoidance by cardiac surgeons in response to the
score cards and concluded that the evidence that quality reporting improved quality was
weak.
Pham et al. (2006) conducted site visits to 36 hospitals in various regions across
the US to assess organizational impact of quality reporting. They found that hospitals
tended to focus on quality improvements in the areas that were being measured, often
neglecting other aspects of care that were not being measured. There were few hospitals
that began to focus on quality in areas that were not reported. Pham et al. also found that
hospitals had to commit resources not only to improvements but also to reporting
activities. By and large, the hospital administrators who felt that reporting improved the
quality of care were primarily from hospitals that had not previously been engaged in
measuring quality indicators.
Since CMS launched the hospitalcompare.hhs.gov website in 2005 the measures
of processes and outcomes used to evaluate hospital quality have evolved. Process
measure reporting involves the documentation that standards of care have been met for
specified conditions and were the first measures to be publicly reported by CMS.
Outcomes measures were added more recently to the website and report on mortality,
length of stay, and readmission rates but may also include some efficiency or cost based
measures. Werner and Bradlow (2006) assessed data from 2004 comparing hospital
performance measures against mortality rates for specific conditions. They found that
there was a statistically significant but small relationship between performance measures
and mortality. In a subsequent study, Werner & Bradlow (2010) evaluated quality scores
for hospitals between 2004 and 2006. They found that the greatest improvements in
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process performance occurred in the hospitals that began with low baseline performance
and that hospitals with high baseline performance tended to maintain their performance.
The impact of improvement on process measures could not be conclusively linked with
improvements in outcomes across all measures. They also note that improvements in
process performance may not be entirely due to actual improvements in care but an
improvement in the documentation of care and processes.
Ryan, Nallamothu, & Dimick (2012) evaluated 30-day mortality and process of
care performance measures for three conditions based on Medicare data from 2000-2008:
myocardial infarction, heart failure, and pneumonia. After accounting for a general
decrease in mortality over that interval, they found for only one of those conditions (heart
failure) a small but statistically significant decrease in mortality that could be linked to
public reporting.
Pay for Performance
Public dissatisfaction with managed care along with new federal attention to
quality in the late 1980’s set the stage for changes in payment systems (Rodwin, 2010).
The first pay for performance (P4P) program was the Quality Care Compensation System
created by the private insurer U.S. Healthcare in 1987. Among other private payers and
Medicaid programs P4P experiments appeared in limited numbers in the early 1990’s
(Rosenthal, Fernandopulle, Song, & Landon, 2004). These programs expanded and
proliferated in the private sector in the early 2000’s (Damberg, Sorbero, Lovejoy,
Martsolf, Raaen, & Mandel, 2014) and continue to be a part of the reimbursement
structure for many private insurance companies.

8
In 1999 the IOM published “To Err is Human.” This groundbreaking report
included an estimate that up to 98,000 Americans died in hospitals each year due to
medical errors and brought concerns about hospital quality and safety to the forefront of
public concern. Based on this report, the Leapfrog Group was formed to improve the
safety of hospitals. The Leapfrog Group is made up of employers that use collective
purchasing power and the recommendations of the group to purchase higher quality
healthcare for their employees. Currently the Leapfrog Group maintains a website of
hospital safety scores and the Hidden Surcharge Calculator for employers to assess the
cost of errors in hospital charges. They have also created a P4P program called the
Leapfrog Hospital Recognition Program which they license to health insurance plans.
The Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration (HQID) program served
as the demonstration project for HVBP which became the permanent federal program
under the ACA to incorporate P4P in the context of Medicare reimbursement. The HQID
was a partnership between CMS and Premier Inc. (an organization of not-for-profit
hospitals) that was initially authorized for the three fiscal years beginning October 1,
2003 and ending September 30, 2006. The demonstration was extended for an additional
3 years ending on September 30, 2009. This program provided incentive payments
totaling $12 million annually to hospitals based on a combination of process and outcome
measures (CMS.org, 2011). According to CMS, 216 hospitals that completed the
demonstrations among which quality improved across measures a total of 18.65% in six
years. However, this is an aggregate score reflecting both process and outcome measures.
The improvement may demonstrate increased compliance with documentation of the
desired processes of care and changes in the methods used for adjusted mortality rates. A
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research review conducted by Petersen et al (2006) found significant evidence for
“gaming” in the reporting of process measures, and improved compliance with
documentation of care rather than improvements in care provided. Changes in the
calculation of adjusted mortality rates are similar to the up-coding that occurred in the
first years of the NY CSRS (Epstein, 2006). Ryan (2009) found that from 2000 to 2006,
there was no significant decrease in 30–day mortality for AMI, heart failure, and
pneumonia, further suggesting that patient outcomes did not actually improve only the
documentation of care processes.
Research on quality improvement created by P4P has mixed results. In 2014
RAND Health published a review of VBP programs which included P4P programs
(Damberg et al., 2014). This analysis included a literature review and expert panel
discussion. The technical expert panel (TEP) included leaders who administer VBP
programs, hospital leaders who implement these programs, and healthcare researchers.
The study found limited research on the success of VBP programs. The literature that
does exist shows mixed results in the areas of quality improvement and cost efficiency.
Based on the TEP and limited literature they have identified six aspects of VBP programs
that appear to lead to success: sizeable incentives, measure alignment either across
programs or specific to the population served, provider engagement, performance targets
that reward both achievement and improvement, and support for improvement. This
RAND report also identified possible undesirable side effects of P4P which included
gaming of data, ignoring quality of care in areas not being reported on, overtreatment of
patients, and avoidance of sicker or socially more challenging patients. There were a
limited number of studies to review that related to such unintended consequences of P4P.
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They found only five publications evaluating the effect of P4P on quality measures not
included in the incentive programs, but most of the studies were of small or shortduration programs. In some cases non-incentivized measures improved with incentivized
measures and in other cases they declined. To date, this type of study has not been done
on the CMS data. They also found no quality studies that showed a change in disparities
and treatment of disadvantaged groups based due to P4P.
Notably missing from the literature are the strategies used for success and details
regarding processes from those providers that are high achievers in P4P. Members of the
TEP state that this is frequently shared at trade conferences but not published, which
could be viewed as information that lacks credibility. The report concludes that continued
quantitative analysis of VBP programs is necessary to monitor outcome. They also point
out a need for qualitative research to better identify key components within organizations
that lead to success in VBP programs.
Hospital Value Based Purchasing
The ACA describes HVBP in prescriptive detail. All hospitals paid under the
IPPS, except those designated as CAH, are required to participate and face adjustment to
their Medicare payments as long as they meet minimum case numbers. The ACA
mandates that the program pertain to all payments to hospitals for discharges occurring
after October 1, 2012 with benchmarking quality data being collected in 2010. The
quality domains used change each year from FY 13 to FY 15 and included domains are
presented in the Definitions section. For each performance measure a score is calculated
for overall achievement and for improvement over the previous year or, in the case of the
first year of a measure, the benchmarking period. Whichever score is higher, actual
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performance or improvement, is used for each measure for the final calculation of the
Total Performance Score (TPS). The hospitals are then ranked by TPS score. The
measurement periods for each Fiscal Year (FY) of payment (October 1 through
September 30) along with the relative weight of each domain are presented in Table 1.
There are also financial consequences for hospitals based on readmission rates
and Hospital Acquired Infections (HAI); however in this study only the HVBP program
will be evaluated. For FY13 hospital could receive an incentive or penalty adjustment
based on the HVBP score of up to 1% on all Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) billed to
Medicare. In FY 14 the percentage change increased to 1.25% and in FY15 the payment
adjustment increased again to 1.5%. The ACA caps the adjustment at 2% in FY17.
The ACA requires that the amount of money distributed in incentive payments
equals the amount of money withheld in penalties. In order to achieve this, a linear
exchange function is applied which represents the relationship between a hospital’s TPS
and the amount of money they receive. The linear exchange function ensures a near
perfect correlation between TPS and the size of the incentive. The adjustment factor
Hospital payment adjustments follows a normal distribution, as seen in Figure 1.
In order to participate in HVBP, hospitals must meet minimum case numbers for
each domain. In FY13 and FY14, they must meet the minimum case number for all of the
domains in order to participate. However in FY15if the hospital meets case numbers for
at least two of the four domains they are eligible to participate in HVBP. The weighting
of the domains in which they do not have enough case numbers to qualify will be
redistributed to the other domains in calculating the TPS. Although CAH are excluded
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from HVBP at present, a pilot program beginning in May 2014 created a VBP scheme for
these hospitals.
Remote Hospitals
For the purposes of this proposed research remote hospitals are defined as
hospitals paid through the IPPS that are located 100 miles or more from the next hospital
receiving IPPS payments. Thompson et al (2102) assessed mortality risk for hemodialysis
patients relative to their distance from a dialysis center. They found that there was
increased mortality risk in patients living more than 100 miles away from their dialysis
center and defined these are remote patients. Goldberg et al (2014) also used 100 miles as
their most remote distance in evaluating 5-year survival rates and likelihood of transplant
for Veterans with liver failure. They found that increased distance from the transplant
center decreased the likelihood of not only receiving and transplant but also being added
to the transplant waiting list. Greater distances increased the risk of death and decreased
access to care.
This study will look at the 25 hospitals identified by CMS as acute care hospitals
which are located more than 100 miles away from the next nearest acute care hospital.
Table 2 lists these hospitals, their location, and their distance from the next nearest
hospital.
The hospitals were identified using the list of hospitals found at
Data.Medicare.gov. The table was downloaded into Microsoft Excel where it was sorted
by hospital type (acute care, Veteran’s Administration, or CAH). The data were further
cleaned to remove hospitals located in US Territories. Hospitals that were missing x,y
coordinates were located using google maps and the coordinates were added to the table.
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Acute care hospitals were separated from other types of hospitals. ArcGIS software was
then used to map the hospitals in the United States. The “near tool” was used in ArcGIS
to determine the distance between each hospital and the next nearest. The hospitals were
then sorted and a map was created with only the 25 remote hospitals. The Cecil G Sheps
Center for Health Services Research at the University of North Carolina provided a
listing of hospital closures since 2010. There have been five hospitals that were paid
through the IPPS that have closed since the beginning of 2013; none of which were
located more than 100 miles from the next acute care hospital. Based on this process it is
assumed that all remote hospitals are accounted for.
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the performance of remote hospitals
through the lens of Hospital Value Based Purchasing.
Research Questions
1. Does Firm Theory apply to remote hospitals?
2. Do nonprofit remote hospitals have higher quality scores than for profit remote
hospitals?
3. Have any nonprofit remote hospitals with a reduced budget due to HVBP
improved their quality scores? Have nonprofit remote hospitals receiving bonus payments
improved their quality in subsequent years?
4. Does the comparative advantage theory of competition apply to remote
hospitals?
5. Have quality measures improved among remote hospitals during the first 3
years of HVBP?
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Specific Aims
1. Analyze the performance of remote hospitals during the first 3 years of HVBP
in terms of TPS and each of the components included in the TPS. There will be a focus
on year to year changes and revenue changes.
2. Assess the resources of each hospital that may influence their score or be
impacted by changes in revenue due to HVBP.
3. Discuss the policy implications of the HVBP program for remote hospitals.
Hypotheses
1. Remote nonprofit hospitals will have higher measures of quality than remote
for-profit hospitals.
2. Remote hospitals receiving reduced Medicare payments due to HVBP will have
a decrease in their TPS in subsequent years and remote hospitals receiving bonus
Medicare payments due to HVBP will increase their TPS in subsequent years.
3. Based on the Comparative Advantage Theory of Competition, remote hospitals
that have more resources will have higher a TPS.
Theoretical Framework
From the perspective of a hospital-based nurse there are two major economic
theories that, together, form a theoretical framework to evaluate various aspects of
hospital performance using the criteria and measures of HVBP: the theory of the firm and
the comparative advantage theory of competition.
The theory of the firm posits that firms emerge in markets in order to maximize
profits and that all decision-making is driven by profit. Increasing the quality of a product
leads to an increased price to the consumer and the possibility of increased profits
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(Coase, 1937). Coase (1937) introduced the concept of transaction cost to firm theory,
which implies that resources are allocated between internal production and outside
contracting in a way which responds to market conditions to maximize profit. This
concept is used to unite the assumptions that a) resource allocation is driven by market
pricing and b) that the decision are made by management within the firm (Coase, 1937).
A hospital can be seen as a firm that produces a service: patient care. Various
aspects of this production are achieved by internal resources and processes or through
outside contracting. Services within the hospital from food service, laundry, and
maintenance to laboratory testing, nurse staffing, and physician staffing can be managed
internally or contracted to outside agencies. Purchasing and cost in a hospital are different
from manufacturing in that the payment to the hospital is made by a third party insurer
instead of the consumer (patient). HVBP rewards higher quality care with higher
reimbursement rates. So although the cost to the consumer (patient) may remain the
same, the quality measures can increase or decrease the earnings of a hospital through
reimbursement in a way that is comparable to an increase or decrease in product pricing
in manufacturing.
In his landmark work Newhouse (1970) created an economic model of the
nonprofit hospital as a firm in which quantity and quality are the goals of the institution
administrator instead of profits. There are several assumptions made by Newhouse. The
first assumption is that hospital expenses are paid directly by the consumer. This
assumption is obviously violated by the presence of health insurance, both private and
public. The second assumption is that there is an ethical component to health care and
patients as consumers have a “right” to care in the hospital. In the case of the nonprofit
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hospital the administrator’s performance cannot be judged in the usual sense of
profitability, so they are instead judged on the quantity of care that is provided and the
quality of that care. This leads to the third assumption which is that the relative
importance of quality versus quantity is the same to the trustees of the hospital board, the
administrator, and the medical staff providing the care.
In this model cost is used as a measure for quality. This is based on the
assumption that increased quality comes at an increased cost. Quantity is measured
simply as patient days. Newhouse (1970) concluded that although the hospital actually
produces a variety of products in the variety of illnesses treated, the conclusions created
by the model are the same whether multiple products or a single product are considered.
The nonprofit hospital administrator will attempt to maximize quality and quantity with a
bias toward quality along the demand curve as constrained by budget. Newhouse also
concludes that although the budget may be different with the introduction of a third party
payer, the conclusions made about the quality-quantity trade-offs remain the same.
Lakdawalla & Philipson (1998) conducted an analysis of nonprofit production as
compared with for profit status in term of competition within industry. They tested their
model with data from the long term care industry. In their model they discuss firms that
are profit-deviators, or those firms that choose not to maximize profits, and separate
profit deviators from nonprofit firms. They conclude that profit-deviators produce more
long term output than profit maximizers. They also postulate that nonprofit firms have
lower costs than for profits because in a mixed production environment there would be no
benefit to nonprofit status if costs were higher than in a for profit firm (Lakdawalla &
Philipson, 1998).
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Malani, Philipson, & David (2003) evaluated three models of nonprofit firms
related to hospitals. The altruism model predicts that nonprofit hospitals are driven by
quality and therefore have higher costs and are less efficient than for profit hospitals. This
contradicts the previous conclusions made by Lakdawalla & Philipson. Malani et al.
argue that both the Newhouse and the Lakdawalla and Phillpson models ignore the tax
benefits of nonprofit status and make the assumption that consumer preference for
nonprofits does not exist. They also argue that the charitable donations in the Lakdawalla
and Philipson model are negligible to hospital budgets.
Nonprofit hospitals often provide higher quality and often are larger in size than
for-profit hospitals. A positive demand shock, such as a rapid increase in the number of
patients and demand for services, would induce the entry of for-profit hospitals into a
given market. A positive shock to labor supply, such as an increase in wages, would
affect for-profit hospitals negatively while nonprofit hospitals would be less adversely
affected. Prices are set by for-profit hospitals with nonprofit hospitals theoretically using
excess earnings to increase quantity and quality (Malani et al., 2003).
Among the 25 remote hospitals identified in this study there are 12 nonprofit, 2
for profit, and 11 government-owned hospitals. Thus, the nonprofit version of firm theory
should apply directly for almost half of remote hospitals. Of the 11 government owned
hospitals, three are federally funded Indian Health hospitals and eight are locally funded
such as county hospitals. The local government funded hospitals may also follow the
nonprofit firm theory. The competitive firm theories do not necessarily apply to this
group because of the nature of remoteness, but could apply to HVBP in general. By the
nature of their geographic location, remote hospitals have not faced competition from
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other hospitals in the past. HVBP created a competitive environment among all hospitals,
pushing the remote hospitals into a market they had not previously experienced.
Hunt and Morgan (2001) proposed the comparative advantage theory of
competition as an update on neoclassical competition theory. Under this theory,
organizations that have better resources compared to their competitors have an advantage
in the marketplace and superior performance. There are several key foundations to this
model which apply quite well to hospitals.
The model states that demand for product is heterogeneous across the industry
and dynamic with regard to consumer preferences. In the hospital market this would
mean that nationally there is heterogeneity in the use of hospital services which is driven
by consumer preference. This can be witnessed through the spending per Medicare
beneficiary which is widely varied across regions for the same condition and episode of
care, indicating that the number of services provided within a hospitalization vary
(Reschovsky, Hadley, O’Malley, & Landon, 2014). The variability in hospital services
used per patient has been associated with patient (consumer) preferences (Baker,
Bundorf, & Kessler, 2014).
Information available for both consumers and administrators within the firm is not
perfect and costly. In the hospital industry this means that neither patients nor hospital
administrators have perfect quality data and that the data that is available comes at a
significant price. Reporting quality data requires financial investment on the part of the
hospital in terms of computer technology and staff to collect and submit data. There is
also a cost to tax payers associated with maintaining reporting websites. Patients still find
interpreting these results difficult (Huppertz & Carlson, 2010).
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The motivation of the firm administrators is one of “constrained self-interest” and
their objective is “superior financial performance”, similar to the tenets of Newhouse’s
nonprofit firm model.
The role of the administrator is to create and implement strategies based on
recognition and understanding. This requires hospital administrators to be able to
recognize and understand all facets of patient care to form a base for their strategies.
Resources are heterogeneous and their mobility is not perfect. For the hospital
industry this can apply to all of the resources required to provide patient care in the
variability that exists in resource availability and the transport or movement of those
resources. A clear example of this is the nursing staff which is that largest resource cost
in the hospital. Nurses are not evenly distributed across the nation and because they are
people with free will, they are not simple to relocate to areas of need (Buerhaus,
Auerbach, Staiger, & Muench, 2013; Kovner, Corcoran, & Brewer, 2011; Siow, 2008).
Resources are both tangible and intangible, including finances, property, legal, human
capital, and organizational and informational knowledge.
The environment influences firm behavior and performance. Bayes (1986)
included internal and external environmental factors in a study examining a variety of
behaviors that were predictive of hospital size.
This study will determine if remote hospitals follow the model of the firm. From
a theoretical standpoint, budget constraints will require a reduction in either quality or
quantity in order to keep cost and revenue equal. Conversely, hospitals receiving a bonus
payment have additional financial resources to move quality even higher. Using
comparative advantage theory as a framework and publicly available information about
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hospitals resources, for example size, staffing, and services provided, the resources will
be compared to actual performance in HVBP.
Definitions
Case-Mix Index
The case-mix index is a modifier applied to a variety of hospital reporting and
billing which accounts for the average severity of illness of patients treated by a single
hospital. Each hospital has a unique case-mix index modifier.
Critical Access Hospital (CAH)
CAHs are hospitals that receive special funding from Medicare to ensure that
there is access to emergency healthcare in rural areas. There are specific requirements for
a hospital to qualify as a CAH. The hospitals must be in a rural area and located at least
35 miles from the next nearest hospital, have fewer than 25 beds, offer 24 hour, 7 day a
week emergency care, and have an annual average length of stay for their patients of less
than 96 hours. The focus of a CAH is to stabilize and then transfer patients to larger
regional hospitals.
Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG)
Hospitalization of Medicare patients is paid for using a system of DRGs. The
DRG represents the average cost of caring for a patient with a specific diagnosis. A single
hospitalization may have more than one diagnosis requiring care. This additional care is
billed through additional charges that are added to the DRG.
Disproportionate Share Hospitals (DSH)
The DSH adjustment to DRG payments is made to account for hospitals with a
very high number of low income patients that rely on Medicaid and/or Medicare Part A
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only to pay for their hospital expenses and for uncompensated care due to low income
uninsured patients.
Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS)
The IPPS is the system under which most hospitals are paid for Medicare patients.
These are Medicare Part A payments made for inpatient stays. Rates are set using a
calculation that includes cost of living adjustments and are based on the true costs of care.
Each hospitalization is paid based on the DRG which is based on the average cost of
treating a patient with that diagnosis. The base rate is made up of labor and nonlabor
costs. The labor portion of the payment is adjusted for cost of living based on the location
of the hospital. For Alaska and Hawaii the nonlabor portion is also adjusted for cost of
living. Teaching hospitals and hospitals treating a large percentage of low income
patients receive additional payment adjustments. If a hospitalization becomes unusually
complicated and expensive relative to the DRG it is known as an outlier and additional
adjustments are made to the DRG payment to account for the unexpected excessive cost
(CMS.org).
Remote Hospitals
For the purpose of this study, remote hospitals are defined as acute care hospitals
paid under the IPPS that are located 100 or more miles away from the next IPPS
hospitals. This distance is based on the shortest distance between two points (“as the
crow flies”) and not actual driving distance.
SCIP
Surgical Care Improvement Project (SCIP)
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Total Performance Score (TPS)
The TPS is the sum of weighted points earned for each domain in HVBP.
Quality Measures
Process Measures Domain
The process measures have been reported to CMS by hospitals since 2004 (Table
3). They are published by CMS in collaboration with the Joint Commission (TJC),
AHRQ, and NQF. There are currently 13 process measures used in HVBP. Hospitals are
awarded points based on the percentage of cases in which each of these processes was
required and documented as completed. Two sets of points are awarded for each measure.
Points are awarded for achievement based on how hospitals compare to all other
hospitals. Points are also awarded for improvement based on how a hospital compares to
its previous reporting period. All points are totaled and the higher score between the
achievement score or the improvement score is used. The score is weighted (see Table 1
for weighting) and then added to the other measures for the TPS. Hospitals must have 10
cases in at least 3 process measures in order to qualify to participate in HVBP.
Outcome Domain
In FY14 hospitals must have enough qualifying cases in two of the three measures
in order to participate in HVBP. For FY15 hospitals must have enough cases in at least 3
of the 5 measures (with mortality measures counting as three measures) in order to have
the outcome measure included in the TPS.
Mortality Measure
Three measures of mortality were added to FY14 HVBP to measure the outcome
of hospitalization for patients (Table 4). As with process measures, hospitals are awarded
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achievement and improvement points based on the percentage of patients that survive 31
days or more following discharge from the hospital. Hospitals must have at least 10 cases
(discharges) in 2 of the measures in order to qualify for HVBP in FY14.
AHRQ Measures PSI-90
The AHRQ Patient Safety Indicator (PSI-90) composite score was added to
HVBP for FY15 (Table 5). This measure is based on eight measures of patient safety and
is reported as a ratio. In this case, the lower the ratio the better the quality. The actual
score for each measure involves a complex calculation which includes the observed rate
of the event, the expected rate, and the population average. Additionally scores are also
weighted based on the size of the hospital. Points are awarded for achievement and
improvement with the higher score used for the TPS. Hospitals must have a minimum of
3 cases on any of the indicators in order to qualify with this measure.
Central Line Associated Blood Stream Infections (CLABSI)
The CLABSI measure is another outcome measure that was added to HVBP for
FY15. As with the PSI-90, a lower number is better because the fewer infection the better
the quality. Hospitals are awarded achievement and improvement points based on the
percentage of patients with central venous catheters that contract blood stream infections.
Hospitals must have at least one predicted CLABSI in order to qualify with this measure.
This prediction is based on the national average infection rate. For example if the national
average CLABSI rate is 0.01, the hospital would need 100 patients with a central line in
order to have one predicted infection. If they have fewer than 100 patients with a central
line, they do not qualify for this measure.
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Efficiency Domain
Hospital efficiency is measured through Medicare Spending per Beneficiary
(MSPB). This is calculated by dividing the hospital MSPB by the national average
MSPB. These MSPBs include all charges accrued by a patient three days prior to and 30
post admission to an acute care hospital. The charges are adjusted to eliminate
adjustments to DRG based on DSH, teaching hospital status, and local cost of living
adjustments. The charges are also modified based on case-mix index to account for
hospitals treating sicker patients. The hospital receives a score in which a lower number
is better. The hospital must have at least 25 episodes of care in order to qualify to use this
domain in their TPS.
Patient Experience of Care Domain
The patient experience of care domain is measured using the Hospital Consumer
Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) survey (Appendix A). This
survey can be attached to the any of the surveys of patient satisfaction that hospitals
currently use or by itself. The surveys can be distributed to a portion or all patients
discharged from the hospital. The survey was written by CMS in conjunction with AHRQ
and has been endorsed by NQF. They have been in use since 2006 and the results have
been publicly reported since 2008. The survey itself consists of 32 questions in eight
domains and demographic information about the patient. Available answers to most
questions are never, sometimes, usually, and always. The score for each domain is based
on the percentage of always answers. Scores are adjusted to account for mode of survey,
such as telephone or mail, and for case-mix to account for comorbidities and illness of
patients. Points are awarded for achievement and improvement. The patient experience of
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care domain is weighted as 30% of the TPS FY13, FY14, and FY15. Hospitals must have
at least 100 surveys collected during the measurement period in order to qualify for
HVBP in FY13 and FY14 or use this domain in their TPS for FY15.
Methods
Data Sources
This study is based on data that are publicly available through a variety of internet
sources. All hospitals registered with CMS are listed on the Data.Medicare.gov website
in a table titled Hospital General Information. This table includes Provider ID, which is
the CMS number under which hospitals are paid, address, and latitude and longitude
coordinates for location. The complete table provides the type of hospital, for example
CAH or Acute Care, if the hospital provides emergency services, and type of ownership.
The data on ownership is questionable because a review of hospitals in New Mexico
shows that there are errors in this category of information. Because there are only 25
hospitals in the study group, all information garnered from this table will be verified
against hospital websites and other internet searches. Also available through the
Data.medicare.gov website in the Hospital Compare archives are tables showing the
performance of each hospital on each measure. The second source of data is the CMS
tables published by CMS on their website which provide the payment adjustment factors
for each hospital by Provider ID.
Additional information about each hospital can be attained from each hospital’s
individual website. Many hospitals post their size, staffing, and services provided on their
websites. The American Hospital Directory (ahd.com) also provides information about
size, services, discharges, and revenue.
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Census tract data can be used to describe the populations served in general terms,
such as average age, population density, and median income. This data is available
through ArcGIS and easily downloaded into the program. Financial status of the hospital
can also be described using Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) adjustment factors as
a proxy for the number of low income patients served by the hospital. The DSH
adjustment factor is available by Provider ID in the CMS Impact File.
Data Analysis
Once all of the data are gathered, sorted, and organized in Excel spreadsheets,
analysis can begin. Hospital data will include census data such as age, income, and
insurance status for the areas served by the hospital. It will also include the size of the
hospital, the number of nurses employed, the number of specialty services offered,
affiliation with other hospitals in a network, and other information that may be
discovered during the research process that would indicate the resources of the hospital.
For resources that are not easily quantifiable, a system will be created to assign scores to
each hospital. The hospitals will then be described using descriptive statistics. Patterns
and correlation between hospital ownership, performance, and improvement will be
assessed. Patterns and correlation between hospital resources, performance, and
improvement will also be assessed. The raw (un-weighted) quality data from each
hospital will be reviewed for patterns of performance. The process of using ArcGIS to
identify hospitals will be clearly described in Paper 2. The HVBP adjustment factors will
also be mapped to show the changes over the first three years in performance. The
changes in performance will also be graphed using MS Excel to evaluate patterns of

27
change. In depth discussion of the changes in TPS and within the measures will be
discussed in Paper 3.
Chapter II: Paper 1
Chapter II will be a manuscript intended for publication reviewing the economic
theories presented above, firm theory and comparative advantage theory of competition,
and how they apply to the economics of hospitals. The concept of the hospital as a firm
will be further described with a focus on literature that supports or contradicts this model.
The success of a hospital based on its ability to compete with other hospitals will also be
developed using the comparative advantage theory in light of the hospital’s position as a
firm.
Chapter III: Paper 2
Chapter III will be a second publication outlining the methods used to identify
and evaluate remote hospital performance in the HVBP. This paper will specifically
focus on the ArcGIS tool and the utility of mapping data. A key component of
successfully using ArcGIS is the process of acquiring data and the methods used to clean
and then verify the accuracy of such data. The purpose of this paper is to describe the
steps of data preparations and then mapping.
Chapter IV: Paper 3
Chapter IV will be a third publication presenting the findings of this study. The
performance of the remote hospitals over the course of the first 3 years of HVBP will
presented with focus on changes in TPS and the individual measures that are combined in
the TPS. The performance of each hospital will be compared to their available resources.
Resources such as size, staffing, and services will be compared to performance in HVBP.
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Chapter V: Discussion and Summary
Chapter V will begin with a summary of the three papers. This summary will be
followed by a discussion of the policy implications of this program. Specific attention
will be focused on the impact this program has on remote hospitals and the communities
they serve. Policy alternatives will be presented and evaluated. In closing, a model for
evaluating other groups of hospitals will be presented.
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Fiscal
Year

Patient
Experience

FY13

July 1,
2011-March
31, 2012

FY14

FY15

April 1,
2012December
31, 2012
January 1,
2014December
31, 2014

Table 1- Measurement Periods and Relative Weights
Percent
Process
Percent Outcome Percent Efficiency
of TPS Measures of TPS Measures of TPS
Measure

30%

July 1,
2011March 31,
2012

30%

April 1,
2012December
31, 2012

30%

January 1,
2014December
31, 2014

70%

45%

20%

NA

Mortality
July 1,
2011June 30,
2012
Mortality
and
AHRQ:
October
15, 2012
to June
30, 2013;
CLABSI:
February
1, 2013December
31, 2013

NA

Percent
of TPS

NA

NA

25%

NA

NA

30%

May 1,
2013 to
December
31, 2013

20%
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Table 2- Remote Hospitals as listed with CMS

MT EDGECUMBE HOSPITAL

SITKA

AK

27

Distance in
Miles to Next
Hospital
176.7

BARTLETT REGIONAL HOSPITAL

JUNEAU

AK

57

176.7

CENTRAL PENINSULA GENERAL HOSPITAL

SOLDOTNA

AK

106

123.7

YUKON KUSKOKWIM DELTA REG
HOSPITAL
FAIRBANKS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

BETHEL

AK

50

742.1

FAIRBANKS

AK

152

513.3

KEEFE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

CO

11

111.4

LOWER KEYS MEDICAL CENTER

CHEYENNE
WELLS
KEY WEST

FL

167

113.7

ST LUKE’S MAGIC VALLEY RMC

TWIN FALLS

ID

224

146.2

CHIPPEWA COUNTY WAR MEMORIAL
HOSPITAL
PORTAGE HEALTH

SAULT SAINTE
MARIE
HANCOCK

MI

82

119.8

MI

36

101.4

BOZEMAN DEACONESS HOSPITAL

BOZEMAN

MT

86

111.0

NORTHERN MONTANA HOSPITAL

HAVRE

MT

49

153.8

ALTRU HOSPITAL

GRAND FORKS

ND

264

106.4

TRINITY HOSPITALS

MINOT

ND

251

119.9

P H S INDIAN HOSP AT BELCOURTQUENTIN N BURDICK
GREAT PLAINS REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER
REGIONAL WEST MEDICAL CENTER

BELCOURT

ND

46

119.9

NORTH PLATTE

NE

16

123.5

SCOTTSBLUFF

NE

184

105.3

GILA REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER

SILVER CITY

NM

68

101.8

NORTHEASTERN NEVADA REGIONAL
HOSPITAL
NYE REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER

ELKO

NV

75

184.8

TONOPAH

NV

10

157.0

PHS INDIAN HOSPITAL AT ROSEBUD

ROSEBUD

SD

35

113.8

MEMORIAL HOSPITAL SWEETWATER
COUNTY
WYOMING MEDICAL CENTER

ROCK SPRINGS

WY

99

105.6

CASPER

WY

188

147.0

CAMPBELL COUNTY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

GILLETTE

WY

90

112.5

SHERIDAN MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

SHERIDAN

WY

88

112.5

Hospital Name

City

State

Bed
s
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Table 3- Process Measures

AMI-7a

Heart attack patients given fibrinolytic medication within 30
minutes of arrival.

AMI-8a

Heart attack patients given percutaneous coronary
intervention (PCI) within 90 minutes of arrival .

HF-1

Heart failure patients given discharge instructions .

PN-3b

Pneumonia patients whose initial emergency room blood
culture was performed prior to the administration of the first
hospital dose of antibiotics.

PN-6

Pneumonia patients given the most appropriate initial
antibiotic(s).

SCIP-Card-2

Surgery patients who were taking heart drugs called beta
blockers before coming to the hospital, who were kept on the
beta blockers during the period just before and after their
surgery.

SCIP-VTE-1

Surgery patients whose doctors ordered treatments to
prevent blood clots after certain types of surgeries.

SCIP-VTE-2

Patients who got treatment at the right time (within 24 hours
before or after their surgery) to help prevent blood clots after
certain types of surgery.

SCIP–Inf–1

Surgery patients who are given an antibiotic at the right time
(within one hour before surgery) to help prevent infection.

SCIP–Inf–2

Surgery patients who are given the right kind of antibiotic to
help prevent infection.

SCIP–Inf–3

Surgery patients whose preventive antibiotics are stopped at
the right time (within 24 hours after surgery).

SCIP–Inf–4
SCIP–Inf–9
(Added for
FY14)

Heart surgery patients whose blood sugar (blood glucose) is
kept under good control in the days right after surgery.
Surgery patients whose urinary catheters were removed on
the first or second day after surgery.
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Table 4- Mortality Measures

MORT-30-AMI

Acute Myocardial Infarction
(AMI) 30-day mortality rate.

MORT-30-HF

Heart Failure (HF) 30-day
mortality rate.

MORT-30-PN

Pneumonia (PN) 30-day
mortality rate.
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Table 5- Patient Safety Indicators (PSI-90)
PSI 03
PSI 06

Pressure Ulcer Rate
Iatrogenic Pneumothorax Rate

PSI 07
PSI 08

Central Venous Catheter-Related Bloodstream
Infection Rate
Postoperative Hip Fracture Rate

PSI 12
PSI 13
PSI 14
PSI 15

Postoperative Pulmonary Embolism or Deep Vein
Thrombosis Rate
Postoperative Sepsis Rate
Postoperative Wound Dehiscence Rate
Accidental Puncture or Laceration Rate
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Figure 1- Distribution of Payment Adjustments

Note: An adjustment factor of 1.0 represents no change in reimbursement; values < 1.0 represent
the percentage penalty and values > 1.0 the percentage bonus relative to baseline.
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Chapter 2: Review of Relevant Economic Theories
The behavior of hospitals related to financial performance and quality of care
provided has been studied by many health economists. Although theories have been put
forth, none has been proven to predict quality outcomes and financial success based on
hospital characteristics and resources. This paper adapts Hunt and Morgan’s (1995)
comparative advantage theory of competition as a framework for hospital economic
behavior to synthesize the previously proposed theories. Resources not included in prior
research will be discussed for consideration in a future model.
Comparative Advantage Theory of Competition
Hunt and Morgan’s (1995) comparative advantage theory of competition posits
that organizations or firms that have better resources compared with their competitors
have an advantage in the marketplace and, therefore, will have superior financial
performance. Resources are both tangible and intangible, including finances, property,
legal, human capital, and organizational and informational knowledge. This theory builds
on several economic theories of competition and resource allocation but draws little from
comparative advantage theory of competition. as developed by David Ricardo (Ricardo,
1821). By addressing various aspects of competition they acknowledge that the behavior
of the firm does not occur in a vacuum, but is reflective of the market environment. The
key concepts of this model can be applied to hospitals.
The model states that demand for product is heterogeneous across the industry
and dynamic with regard to consumer preferences. This implies that markets pertain to
segments of an industry, not the industry as a whole and therefore the standard demand
curve does not apply to the industry as a whole (Hunt & Morgan, 1995). Demand for
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hospital services is heterogeneous on a national level and is driven by consumer
preference. Medicare spending can be used to illustrate this characteristic. Spending per
Medicare beneficiary is widely varied from one region to the next for the same condition
and episode of care, indicating that the number of services provided within a
hospitalization varies by location (Reschovsky et al., 2014). There are many factors that
have been identified which influence the number of services provided during a
hospitalization representing variation in both supply and demand (Skinner, 2011). Baker,
Bundorf, & Kessler, (2014) analyzed data on mortality and spending, data on physicians,
specialists, and availability of hospital beds, patient incomes, and survey data of selfreported health status and preferences for care. They found that supply factors predict
23% of the variation in spending and the health and income of patients explains another
12% of variation in spending. To a lesser degree, patient (consumer) preferences were
also found to contribute 5% to the variation in spending(Baker et al., 2014). Even within
local markets there is heterogeneity in consumer demand. Factors such as distance,
quality, ownership type, and socioeconomic factors all influence the consumer in his or
her choice of hospital (Brekke, Siciliani, & Straume, 2009; Halonen-Akatwijuka &
Propper, 2012; Needleman, 2001; Romley & Goldman, 2011; Tay, 2003).
Information available for both consumers and administrators within a firm is not
perfect and it is costly (Hunt & Morgan, 1995). Quality reporting by hospitals has created
large sets of data for both administrators and consumers. Hospital administrators feel that
only a limited number of measures are included in quality improvement programs and
may not provide complete information (Pham et al., 2006). Both the way in which quality
data is presented and the sheer volume of data may lead consumers to avoid using the
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reports on quality or to make poor decisions (Schlesinger, Kanouse, Martino, Shaller, &
Rybowski, 2013). Patients may also find interpreting these results difficult because in
healthcare the quality of the product or outcome is not always obvious to the consumer
(Chang et al., 2010; Easley & O’Hara, 1983; Huppertz & Carlson, 2010; Pauly, 1987).
Patients may be able to judge some aspects of quality for themselves, such as hospital
food or the friendliness of a healthcare provider, but they are generally unable to judge
the quality of their medical care as related to provider knowledge or skill (Sloan, Picone,
Taylor, & Chou, 2001).
In addition, information that is available comes at a significant price. Reporting
quality data requires financial investment on the part of the hospital in terms of computer
technology and staff to collect and submit data (Pham et al., 2006). There is also a cost to
taxpayers associated with maintaining government agencies that collect and publish the
data (e.g., through quality reporting websites).
Box 1
Theory of the Firm
The theory of the firm states that firms emerge in markets in order to maximize
profits and that all decision making is driven by profit. Increasing the quality of a
product leads to an increased price to the consumer and the possibility of increased
profits. Coase (1937) is credited with introducing the concept of transaction cost to
firm theory. Resources are allocated between internal production and outside
contracting in a way which responds to market conditions and best maximizes
profit.
The motivation of the firm administrators is one of “constrained self-interest”
(Hunt & Morgan, 1995). The constraint on self-interest is created by morals, ethics, and a
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desire to balance the needs of the consumer with reward for the administrator. In other
words, the administrator does not harm the consumer in the pursuit of maximum profit.
The nature of the product of hospitals lends itself to an administration with at least some
motivation to constrain self-interest. Although administrators have financial goals and
seek to further their positions as leaders, they are in the business of healing and should be
guided by moral and ethical imperatives in addition to bottom-line concerns (Schnoor,
Heyde, & Ghanem, 2015). Thus, constrained self-interest is a key feature of the hospital
firm.
The objective of the firm is “superior financial performance” (Hunt & Morgan,
1995). Superior financial performance replaces the idea of maximum financial
performance from classical competition theory because maximum performance is a
theoretical term that cannot be attained in practice. For-profit (FP) hospital administrators
do seek to improve the financial performance of the hospital and produce returns for
investors. Although not-for-profit (NFP) hospitals do not seek superior financial
performance, this concept can still be applied by substituting superior quality and
quantity of services for financial performance. Newhouse (1970) created an economic
model of the NFP hospital as a firm in which quantity and quality are the goals of the
institution administrator instead of profits. In the case of the nonprofit hospital, the
administrator’s performance cannot be judged in the usual sense of profitability; rather
administrators are judged on the quantity of care that is provided and the quality of that
care. NFP hospitals therefore have a preference for balance between quality and quantity
(while maintaining financial viability) instead of profit to measure their performance
(Chakravarty, Gaynor, Klepper, & Vogt, 2006; Malani et al., 2003).
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The role of the administrator is to create and implement strategies based on
recognition and understanding of the functions within the firm (Hunt & Morgan, 1995).
This requires hospital administrators to be able to recognize and understand all facets of
patient care to form a base for their strategies. In a sample of community hospitals from
1995-2000, Bazzoli, Chen, Zhao, & Lindrooth, (2008) found that not all quality measures
suffered during financial downturns for the hospital. They suggest that hospital leaders
focused cuts on areas not related to direct patient care in order to preserve their process
measure compliance and quality. Hospital administrators may also choose to invest in
nonclinical components of patient stays, such as improved food service, upscale design in
patient rooms, and other amenities attractive to patients (Romley & Goldman, 2011).
These strategies show an understanding of both patient demand and the resources needed
to meet regulatory standards.
Resources are heterogeneous and their mobility is not perfect (Hunt & Morgan,
1995). This can apply to all of the resources required to provide patient care and the
variability that exists not only in the availability of a resource but also the transport or
movement of that resource. A clear example of this is the nursing staff which is the
largest resource cost in the hospital. Nurses are not evenly distributed across the nation.
They are people with free will, and it is not easy to induce them to relocate to areas of
need (Buerhaus et al., 2013; Kovner et al., 2011; Siow, 2008). There are numerous
hospital resources that can be described, including financial status (Bazzoli et al., 2008)
and efficiency (Gan & Nighohossian, 2013), nonclinical infrastructure (Romley &
Goldman, 2011), services offered (Bazzoli et al., 2007), electronic medical records
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(Callen, 2014), belonging to a network (Chakravarty et al., 2006), and nurse staff
characteristics (Aiken, 2002).
Bazzoli et al., (2007) found that hospitals with lower cash flow to total revenue
had lower net assets in infrastructure and lower compliance with process based quality
performance measures. Hospital characteristics which could be considered resources that
were positively correlated to more infrastructure included the number of tertiary services,
output as measured by patient days and births, the percentage of nursing staff who are
RNs, and the hospital wage index. Resources that were positively correlated with quality
process measures were patient days and the percentage of nurses who are RNs. Greater
per-capita income in the community served by the hospital also correlated positively with
quality process measure compliance (Bazzoli et al., 2007).
The environment influences, but does not dictate, firm behavior and performance
(Hunt & Morgan, 1995). The local market can be considered the environment in which
the hospital exists and must be included when considering the behavior and performance
of a hospital. The decision surrounding ownership type and the structure of the market
are both endogenous and created by internal decisions of hospital firms within the market
(Malani et al., 2003; Robinson, 2001). Hospital decisions are in turn influenced by
market conditions such as mixed ownership (Horwitz & Nichols, 2007; Malani et al.,
2003) and consumer preferences (Needleman, 2001). Ownership type matters very little
compared to other economic incentives especially when the decision to be NFP or FP
may be based on the specific economic incentives of a particular market (Pauly, 1987). It
is likely that FP hospitals select more profitable markets to enter (Sloan et al., 2001).
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The specific market mix of NFP, FP, and government owned hospitals influences
production behavior (Horwitz & Nichols, 2007), however, ownership type has less
influence on performance when hospitals are in close proximity (Schlesinger & Gray,
2006). One tool that can account for market mix and proximity in measuring market
share is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is a common economic measure
of market competition. The HHI for a hospital can be calculated using some measure of
hospital volume such as number of beds or annual discharges to assign an index score to
each hospital which represents their share of the market (Garnick, Luft, Robinson, &
Tetreault, 1987; Tay, 2003).
It is important to note that including comparative advantage in the name of this
model is misleading. The comparative advantage theory first developed by David Ricardo
in 1819 explained why it was beneficial for a nation to import a commodity from another
country despite being able to produce that same product at a lower cost. This is because
of the opportunity cost of diverting resources, such as labor and time, from a higher
priced export item. They have footnoted that their use of this term is based on the
Ricardo’s assumption of heterogeneity and immobility of resources and the “comparative
advantage” a firm has in how they use these resources. Their theory also contradicts
Ricardo’s prediction of production specialization and is designed to explain diversity
within both markets and individual firms. They have created a model where comparative
advantage in the resource utilization coupled with competitive advantage in the market
results in superior performance. Despite the confusion created by using the phrase
“comparative advantage” in the name of the theory, Hunt and Morgan have put forth
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concepts that can be applied to describe and predict firm behavior in a competitive
market.
Additional Resource and Market Factors
There are an infinite number of variables that could be considered hospital
resources and contribute to market conditions. The factors listed in Table 1 take into
account market factors and hospital characteristics that may influence the performance of
a hospital but have not always been included in previous theories. Examples are listed of
patient factors, market factors, and hospital factors.
Patient factors
Demographic characteristics such as the age, population density, education level,
and income level of the community surrounding a hospital can influence the demand for
services, the quality of services, and provide financial support through charitable giving
for NFP hospitals (Needleman, 2001; Pauly, 1987). One theory for the existence of NFP
firms is that there is a contract failure between the community and hospital. In this case
the contract fails due to the perceived failure on the part of FP hospitals to deliver optimal
levels of care in lieu of profits (Easley & O’Hara, 1983). This is similar to the concept of
noncontractible quality. These are quality measures which cannot be contracted on by the
consumer because they are not easily seen or measured from the patient perspective, but
they are still valuable to the patient and tend to be costly for hospitals to maintain.
Example of quality that cannot easily be measured include cleanliness, nutritiousness of
meals, and skill of providers. Because noncontractible quality can be decreased to
increase profits, it can encourage the entry of NFP hospitals into the market due to the
preference of consumers to purchase this perceived quality (Malani et al., 2003). In the
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altruistic model NFP follow the pricing set by FPs. In the noncontractible quality model
the NFP are higher because consumers are willing to pay more for what they perceive to
be quality (Malani et al., 2003). NFP should be the dominant type of ownership in
markets where noncontractible quality is the consumer preference. But NFP status is less
appealing for the firm as the industry becomes more profitable. Entry of a FP hospital
into a market may be driven by consumer preference for availability of service and
acceptance of increased cost related to that availability. FP hospital may not maintain
excess capacity but choose to selectively ration and maintain optimal capacity for
maximum profits. FP will succeed in markets where consumer preference is for
availability of service not value as a function of quality related to cost (Holtmann, 1983).
An older population is likely to need more care and more services and to be
insured by Medicare, meaning lower reimbursement to the hospital. Wealthier, privately
insured patients mean higher reimbursement as well as increased charitable donations
which can add significantly to the finances of the firm (Needleman, 2001; Pauly, 1987).
Education attainment has been linked with health outcomes (Asada, Whipp, Kindig,
Billard, & Rudolph, 2014) and should be included as factor that influences both quantity
of service required and demand for quality of service. The demographics of the
populations served both directly and indirectly affect the quality and profits of a hospital.
Market Factors
The market factors that influence hospital behavior in this model are market
competition and ownership mix. The HHI can be used as a measure of market
competition that influences which resources the hospital may choose as investments as
well as the level of quality that they chose to provide (Brekke et al., 2009; Horwitz &
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Nichols, 2007; Romley & Goldman, 2011; Tay, 2003). The number of hospitals in a
market and the population density of the area served impacts the HHI of individual
hospitals in both urban and rural settings (Horwitz & Nichols, 2007, 2011).
It is often believed that FP hospitals may underprovide quality and/or quantity of
care (Chang et al., 2010) and consumers trust NFP hospitals to provide quality at
reasonable cost (Pauly, 1987). NFPs offer comfort and implicit trust because of their lack
of profit motive and implied quality (Needleman, 2001). Needleman (2001) found little
evidence to support quality or cost differences between NFP and FP hospitals and
Schlesinger & Gray (2006) found ownership type alone for hospitals is not an indicator of
quality or cost of care. However, the market mix of NFP, FP, and government owned
hospitals influences production behavior. Horwitz & Nichols (2007) found a strong
relationship between hospital ownership type, the mix of ownership in the market, and
the services provided by ownership type. The expectations that patients may have of
hospitals based on their ownership type and the mix of ownership within a given market
influence the behaviors of the hospitals in that market.
Hospital Factors
Hospital factors include infrastructure which exists due to previous investment
and cash not related to patient care, such as capital investments, charitable contributions,
and local government lump sum support. This is similar to the model used by Bazzoli et
al. (2008) in which they used patient characteristics, hospital characteristics, and financial
outcomes to predict quality process measures. Romley & Goldman (2011) use the term
“revealed quality” to describe those hospital characteristics that patients attribute to
quality. In healthcare factors related to quality as judged by the patients are not always
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the factors that improve health outcomes (Easley & O’Hara, 1983; Sloan et al., 2001).
Hospital infrastructure also includes attributes such as private rooms and the size of the
hospital as described by the number of beds as well as high-tech equipment such as
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) machines and electronic medical records (EMR).
Network affiliation can be an asset to a hospital in terms of capital, expanded
referral networks, and vendor negotiations for a variety of products from supplies to
information technology. Greater than 80% of FP hospitals are part of a network while
less than 60% of NFP hospitals are part of a network. Hospitals entering the market are
generally smaller than existing hospitals and are more likely to be part of a network
(Chakravarty et al., 2006). This becomes important when considering how the number of
service lines a hospital has to offer.
Services vary in profitability and a hospital that is able to provide a higher number
of profitable services will have a higher profit margin (Horwitz & Nichols, 2007).
Building on the Newhouse model, output maximization in a mixed market the FP hospital
will try to attract more profitable patients by offering those services over less profitable
services. This impacts the volume of care NFP hospitals can provide if they are left with
only low profit patients. The NFP hospitals then begin to offer those services to attract
those patients back. In a mixed market with many FP hospitals, NFP hospitals are more
likely to offer profitable services such as open-heart surgery and MRI scans. NFP are less
likely to offer unprofitable services in a mixed market with a high number of FP
hospitals, leaving those services such as HIV/AIDS treatment and emergency psychiatric
care to government hospitals. For NFP hospitals there is a large negative relationship
between the effect of profitability and the decision to offer a service in a low FP market
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(Horwitz & Nichols, 2007). There may be market characteristics that attract FP hospital
and a demand for high profitability services that were not included in this analysis.
New payment systems have also created a link between profit and quality where
quality is no longer independent of profit. Pay for performance programs have created a
financial incentive for hospitals to provide quality care. Although efficiency in care
delivery and a good payer mix heavily influence profit margins, quality metrics now also
influence payment rates. Hospital Value Based Purchasing (HVBP) is a federal pay for
performance program that compares all hospitals that are paid under the Inpatient
Prospective Payment System against each other. After just three years of the program, it
is unclear if this national level of competition has an effect on hospital behavior and
performance.
The largest and perhaps most neglected resource in previous theoretical models is
nursing. Nursing resources directly influence the quality of care provided and a variety of
nurse factors have been studied for their association to quality measures and patient
outcomes. High quality nursing can add to the profit margin of a hospital by providing
efficient care and attracting privately insured patients (Tuazon, 2007).
Factors that have previously been associated with improved quality include lower
use of agency or temporary nursing staff (Aiken, Shang, Xue, & Sloane, 2012), the
education level of RNs (Kutney-Lee, Sloane, & Aiken, 2013), and nurse to patient ratios
(Martin, 2015). Skill mix, described as the number of RNs compared with other licensed
and unlicensed nursing staff, may also influence the quality and cost of care. There is
limited research associating quality and nursing years of experience. An Academic
Search Complete database search using the terms nurse, years of experience, quality, and
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outcomes from 2008 to 2015 resulted in 149 articles. Of these, only two (Aydin,
Donaldson, Stotts, Fridman, & Brown, 2015; Rochefort, Buckeridge, & Abrahamowicz,
2015) specifically included years of experience as a factor affecting patient outcomes or
quality of care. Aydin et al (2015) found a strong positive correlation between quality and
years of experience. Rochefort et al (2015) only published their study proposal and
results are pending.
Discussion
Economic models of hospital behavior have focused on a variety of factors which
influence financial performance and the quality of care. Only one model (Bazzoli et al.,
2007) included any nursing factors in their analysis and they only considered the
percentage of nurses that were RNs. Market factors and hospital resources including
multiple nursing factors have not been fully integrated into a single model. Studies have
previously highlighted the role of nursing staffing ratios and RN education levels related
to patient outcomes, but not tied these factors into economic performance models. Nonpatient care nurse staffing, such as for unit-based educators, have been completely
excluded from discussions of quality and performance. They may be relevant to both the
practice ability of nurses as well as adherence with documentation of quality metrics.
Although individual characteristics of nurse staffing have been studied, the incorporation
of all of these factors has not been linked with other hospital factors in an attempt to
describe hospital behavior, financial performance, and quality measures or patient
outcomes.
Large scale databases do not contain these important characteristics of hospital
nurses. The National Database of Nursing Quality Indicators (NDNQI) has some of this
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data collected for some hospitals. However, participation in NDNQI is voluntary and the
level of data reported is at the unit level, not aggregated at the hospital level. Data
describing hospital nursing FTEs, education level, years of experience, and non-patient
care RN staffing (educators, managers) would have to be collected in a new survey or on
a small scale with hospitals willing to volunteer this information.
Conclusion
The comparative advantage theory of competition provides a modern view
competition between firms and is easily adapted to hospitals as firms. This theory
provides a starting point for synthesizing economic theories on hospital behavior. Nearly
all theories of hospital behavior leave out characteristics of nurse staff as a measure of
resources. As the largest single component of a hospital budget nursing resources are
likely to have a significant impact on the behavior of hospitals in both financial
performance and quality of care. Future studies are needed to devise measures and
sampling techniques for assessing nursing resources and then incorporating them into
economic models of hospital performance.
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Table 1
Factors Influencing Hospital Behavior
Hospital Factors
Nursing Resources

Patient Factors

Market Factors

Age

Market competition

Skill mix

Income

Ownership Mix

Education

Education

Patient ratio

Population Density

Experience
Educational Support
Service lines
Network affiliation
Capital investment/Charitable
contributions
Infrastructure
MRI
EMR
Private rooms
Number of Beds

FP/NFP/Government
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Chapter 3: Methods and Definition of Remote Hospitals
Rural, frontier, remote, urban, and sub-urban are some of the labels used to
describe geographic areas and are often used in governmental policy for resource
allocation and for characterizing populations by location of primary residence. In health
care and health policy, non-urban populations are characterized or studied in terms of
access to care and health outcomes using a variety of terms and definitions (e.g., rural,
frontier, remote). Hospitals and other health care facilities are categorized by their
geographic area which is generally defined by population. Classifying hospitals in terms
of rural vs. urban locale may obscure important differences among rural communities in
terms of access to hospitals. Up to this point hospitals have not been characterized by
their distance from other hospitals. In this paper, the variation in terminology for rural
classifications will be explored. Clinically relevant information linking travel time and
distance to health outcomes will be coupled with a geographic analysis of hospital
locations in the United States (US).
Classifications of Locale as Urban, Rural, or Frontier
Various agencies and organizations use concepts of population or population
density, distance, and travel time to create definitions of urban, rural, and frontier. The
variety of definitions reflects the variety of purposes for such classification schemes.
The US Census Bureau has three primary classifications of population in an area:
Urbanized Areas (UAs), Urban Places Outside of UAs, and Rural Places and Territory.
UAs have a population of at least 50,000 people in a continuously developed
geographical area. UAs consist of at least one central place (e.g., municipality) together
with adjacent areas that are densely settled (“urban fringe”). An “urban place” is densely
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populated geographic area with a population of at least 2,500 people that is independently
incorporated (or that has a community identity, even if not incorporated). Rural places
and territories are geographic areas with a population of less than 2,500 people that are
not UAs or urban places (US Department of Commerce Census Bureau, 1994).
Another classification scheme, designed by the US Department of Agriculture, is
the Urban Influence codes. These were developed to categorize rural areas based on their
proximity to metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), as defined by the Office of
Management and Budget, and to determine the influence of urban proximity on rural
areas. All counties were initially grouped into MSA and non-MSA counties based on the
presence or lack of at least one urban area in a county or equivalent jurisdiction(US
Department of Agriculture, 2016).
Because of the broad nature of the term rural as defined by the Census Bureau, the
term frontier has been developed to describe rural areas that are at a great distance from
UAs and have a very low population density. The National Center for Frontier
Communities (NCFC) has created a guide to compare the definition of frontier used by
various organizations. The Consensus Development Project was convened by the NCFC
and the Office of Rural Health Policy (ORHP), (a division of the Health Resources and
Services Administration (HRSA) in the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS)), to create a matrix based on a point system that uses population density, distance
to a market for services, and travel time to a market for services to identify frontier areas
(Frontier Education Center, 1998). The ORHP and the USDA identify Frontier and
Remote (FAR) areas in four levels based on travel time to population centers (Table 1).
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The Affordable Care Act (ACA) defines Frontier Health Professional Shortage
Areas as an area in which: “(A) with a population density less than 6 persons per square
mile within the service area; and (B) with respect to which the distance or time for the
population to access care is excessive.” It goes on to define frontier counties as those in
which the population is less than 6 people per square mile and frontier states as those in
which 50% or more of the counties are frontier counties. The distance or travel time to
access care which is considered “excessive” is not defined explicitly.
California’s Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development uses the term
frontier to describe medical service areas in which the population is less than 11 people
per square mile with no UA in the area. However, the distance is not specified.
The Rural Health Research Center (RHRC) created Rural-Urban Commuting
Area (RUCA) Codes which use information about commuting to and from employment
together with the definition of UA and Urban Cluster (2,500 to 50,000 people with the
same density as a UA) from the Census Bureau along with to define rural areas. Those
areas identified as isolated rural areas are often considered frontier according to the
NCFC.
The Center for Rural Health and the Office of Advancement of Telehealth
Methodology for Designating Frontier Areas defined frontier areas by zip codes in which
population centers that are not part of a large rural town and are more than 60 minutes or
60 miles to a short-term hospital that has at least 75 beds (Health, 2006).
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) defines frontier areas as
those identified by the Secretary or US counties or county equivalents that have a
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population of less than 6 people per square mile (Department of Health and Human
Services & Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2005).
Rural Urban Continuum Codes (RUCC) were created by the USDA to describe
counties as metropolitan or nonmetropolitan based on their population, degree of
urbanization, and distance to metropolitan areas. There are nine designations as described
in Table 2.
There are similarities between the methodologies used by different agencies to
further define geographic areas considered to be rural. Some definitions are more explicit
and detailed than other. Table 3 provides a summary comparison of these classifications.
Influence of Locale on Health Outcomes
Zhang, Tao, & Anderson (2003) conducted a secondary analysis of data 1994
National Health Interview Survey (N = 17,412) to examine access to health care by rural
adults. They used the 1991 Area Resource File, a county-specific data set of health
resources to examine access to and utilization of health care services. Based on county of
residence, individuals were classified into one of 4 categories based on population (≥
10,000 vs. < 10,000) and proximity to an MSA (adjacent, not adjacent). Among the
subset of NHIS rural participants 18 to 64 years of age categorized as having poor
general health status (n = 1664, 9.5%), Zhang et al. found that the hospital discharge rates
among those from counties with population ≥ 10,000 and adjacent to a MSA (n = 419),
26.4% (i.e., 26.4 hospital discharges per 100 persons in poor health), was significantly
higher (p < .05) than in any of the other three groups: 17.2% in counties of population ≥
10,000 that were not adjacent to a MSA (n = 559); 15.3% in counties of population <
10,000 adjacent to MSA (n = 270); and 16.6% in counties of population < 10,000, not
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adjacent to MSA (n = 416). The magnitudes of those differences were meaningful from a
standpoint of access to hospital care as well as health policy and resource allocation (e.g.,
aggregate costs of hospitalization). In addition, the mean length of stay was 11.9 (SD =
4.65) days in the most rural group (population < 10,000, not adjacent to MSA) which was
5 to 6 days greater than any of the other groups. However, they reported that after
weighting standard errors to account for the NHIS sampling design that the difference
was not statistically significant. Even so, differences of the observed magnitudes in
hospital discharge rates and lengths of stay suggest that distance to services may be a
relevant consideration in addition to population for studying access and outcomes.
Hospital Definitions
The US healthcare market is composed of a variety of types of hospitals.
Hospitals vary by ownership type: for-profit, non-profit, federal government, local
governments, and religious organization to name a few. They also vary by payer
classification. Except for military hospitals, the vast majority of hospitals participate and
receive payments from Medicare and/or Medicaid and must follow the rules that the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) puts forth. CMS has published a series of fact
sheets available at CMS.gov to clarify the different payment categories into which
hospitals may fit.
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 created a special class of hospitals known as
Critical Access Hospitals (CAHs) so that small rural hospitals that may struggle due to a
low volume of patients can receive extra funding. These hospitals are financially
supported because they provide critical access to acute care in rural areas. In order to
qualify as a CAH the hospital must adhere to specific rules. They cannot have more than
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25 acute care inpatient beds, they must be at least 35 miles away from another hospital,
their average length of stay must be less than 96 hours, and they must have emergency
services available at all times.
Most hospitals receiving reimbursement from Medicare or Medicaid fall under the
Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS) of the CMS. Hospitals in Maryland are not
paid under the IPPS but are included in many CMS payment adjustment programs
(Department of Health and Human Services & Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, 2015). CAHs are not paid under the IPPS and have not been included in CMS
payment adjustment plans (Department of Health and Human Services & Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2015).
Hospitals that are paid under the IPPS must adhere to standard CMS Condition of
Participation (CoPs). They are required to report quality metrics and are subject to
payment reform strategies. Most inpatient Medicare stays are paid by diagnosis related
groupings (DRGs). DRGs are determined based on a complex formula that considers
average regional cost and length of stay for specific diagnoses. These payments are also
adjusted by percentages for a number of variances each hospital may face. These include
adjustments for quality measures, the wage index, and disproportionate share adjustments
(to offset uncompensated care). CAHs generally transfer patients who are sicker or
require specialized services to larger IPPS hospitals. IPPS hospitals will be the focus of
this study; hence, for the remainder of this article, the term hospital(s) refers to IPPS
hospital(s) (i.e., not CAH or military hospitals).
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State Boundaries
For people living near a state line, the closest hospital may be in the neighboring
state. However, except in emergencies, using a hospital in another state commonly is not
an option due to insurance constraints. For instance, because Medicaid is a state funded
program, it is generally required that Medicaid recipients seek care from within state
boundaries (Familiesusa.org, 2002). Similarly, insurance networks for privately insured
patients generally operate within state boundaries because of state regulation of health
insurance (Cauchi, 2014). Traditional Medicare is a national program that is not restricted
by state boundaries. In general Medicare part A covers hospitalization, part B covers
outpatient care (including some ambulatory surgical services), and part D covers
outpatient medications. Many Medicare beneficiaries either purchase additional part B
coverage through a specific carrier or enroll in a Medicare Advantage program. Similar to
private insurance, there are network restrictions associated with most of these
supplemental plans and crossing state boundaries for non-emergency care may not be
covered. For these reasons, in this analysis distance and driving time between hospitals
was calculated on a state by state basis searching for the nearest hospitals within state
boundaries.
Distance and Time to Treatment
From a clinical perspective distance and travel time can have a profound effect on
health outcomes. Thompson et al (2102) assessed mortality risk for hemodialysis patients
relative to their distance from a dialysis center. They found that there was increased
mortality risk in patients living more than 100 miles away from their dialysis center and,
for that reason, defined those as remote patients. Goldberg et al (2014) also used greater
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than 100 miles as their most remote distance for evaluating 5-year survival rates and
likelihood of transplant for Veterans with liver failure. They found that increased distance
from the transplant center decreased the likelihood of receiving a transplant and even of
being added to the transplant waiting list. Greater distances increased the risk of death
and decreased access to care.
The golden hour of trauma was first described in the 1960’s by Dr R Adams
Cowley and refers to the dramatic improvement in outcomes if major trauma victims
reach the operating room within one hour following a traumatic injury (Eisele, 2008).
This phrase has also been applied to other acute medical conditions, such as acute
myocardial infarctions, cerebral vascular accidents (CVA)/stroke, and heat stroke(Heled,
Rav-Acha, Shani, Epstein, & Moran, 2004; Iqbal, 2011; Smalling, 2009).
For myocardial infarction with ST segment elevation (STEMI) it is recommended
that the time from first medical contact (either the patient walks into the emergency
department or emergency medical service (EMS) contact in the field) to the time that the
cardiac muscle is re-perfused, also known as door-to-balloon time(Bates, 2009), be less
than 90 minutes for patients that present to a facility with percutaneous coronary
intervention (PCI) capabilities and less than 120 minutes for patients that transfer to a
PCI capable facility(Yancy et al., 2013). As of 2011 only 39% of hospitals had PCI
capability (Langabeer et al., 2013).
The best outcomes for CVA/stroke also occur when interventions are within 60
and 90 minutes of the event. Similar to myocardial infarction, ischemic strokes caused by
a blood clot in a vessel in the brain are most successfully treated by removal of the clot
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and reperfusion of the cerebral tissue. Administration of medication to dissolve the clot
within 60 minutes of symptom onset yields the best outcomes (Iqbal, 2011).
Heat stroke occurs when someone accumulates more internal body heat that they
can effectively dissipate. A victim of exertion heatstroke often pushes themselves in
physical activity to the point of collapse. Effective treatment requires rapid recognition of
the condition and outcomes are improved with initiation of cooling within one hour of
collapse (Heled et al., 2004).
Based on the literature describing the importance of distance and time to access
care, three groups of remote hospitals were identified for comparison. The first group
consisted of hospitals that were 100 miles or more from the next hospital. The second and
third group consisted of hospitals that were at least 90 or 60 minutes driving time away
from the next nearest hospital. These measures do not necessarily reflect the distance and
time that patients travel to access hospital care; they represent the distance and time that
separates hospitals. This may be of particular relevance for outcomes for patients who
require transfer to another facility for specialty services. It may also reflect the potential
to impact access care if one of these hospitals should close.
Methods
The hospital general information table was downloaded from the
data.medicare.gov website. This table includes the Medicare provider ID, hospital name,
address, city, state, county, zip code, phone number, hospital type (ie: acute, CAH, VA),
hospital ownership, and location by latitude and longitude (x,y coordinates). The table
was converted to a Microsoft Excel Spreadsheet for sorting and editing. The table was
first sorted by hospital type so that the acute care hospitals could be separated into a new
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spreadsheet. The single x,y coordinate column was separated into two columns as
required by the mapping software. The hospitals were then sorted by state and those
located in US territories outside the continental US, Hawaii, and Alaska were removed
from the table. The table was then re-sorted by each column to find and correct the
missing data. For example, the Whiteriver Indian Hospital in Whiteriver Arizona did not
have x,y coordinates listed. The hospital was located on google maps and x,y, coordinates
were entered into the table.
GIS Analysis
A new map was created in ArcGIS 10.3 using the USA states basemap available
through ArcGIS online. The hospital table created in Excel was then added to the map
and the x,y coordinates plotted in order to add the hospital locations.
A new road network was created using Here Streetmap Premium from ESRI
(2015 Q1 release). This map contains roads, speed limits, one ways, and other features
that can be used to determine driving distances and travel times. The hospitals were
loaded onto the network and then driving distance and driving time were determined
using an OD Cost Matrix network analysis. This function is based on analyzing the
distance and drive time between an “origin” and two or more “destinations”. Each state
was processed individually to determine distances between hospitals only within a state’s
boundaries. The result was a separate list for each state of distances and times from each
hospital to every other hospital in the state. A summary analysis of each state’s data table
created a list of only the nearest hospital to each facility. By combining these lists, a
national list of driving distance and driving time can be created for each hospital to the
next nearest within-state hospital. Hospitals were classified into three groups based on
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their proximity of driving distance: distance greater than 100 miles, travel time greater
than 60 minutes, and travel time greater than 90 minutes. These hospital lists were then
added to the map and the symbology was changed for each set of hospitals so that they
could be identified on the map. The final map is seen in Figure 1.
Results
There are 30 hospitals located 100 miles or more by driving distance from the
next nearest within-state hospital (range: 101.5 to 324.2 miles). This includes two
hospitals in Alaska and Hawaii listed without distances cannot be accessed from the next
nearest hospital by roads. The travel time between each hospital and the next nearest
hospital ranges from 93 to 480 minutes. Of the 30 hospitals, 23 (76.7%) are located in the
Western region of which 16 (53.3% of the total) are in the Mountain division of the
Western region as defined by the Census Bureau.
The picture of remoteness changes if driving time between hospitals is used. Not
including the hospitals that cannot be reached by roads, there are 125 hospitals that are
more than 60 minutes away from the next nearest hospital. The travel time ranges from
60 to 480 minutes, and the distance ranges from 31.9 to 322.3 miles. There are 51
hospitals that are more than 90 minutes away from the next nearest hospital. They range
in travel time from 90 to 480minutes and travel distance from 53.4 to 322.3 miles. Of the
hospitals that are 60 minutes or more away from the next nearest hospital, 64 (51.2%) are
located in the Western region and 45 (36% of the total) are in the mountain division of
the Western region. Another 35 (28%) are in the Midwest region. The map in Figure 1
shows these hospitals and describes them by distance and travel time to the next nearest
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hospital. Figure 2 is a map of all of the IPPS hospitals in the US for comparison. A list of
the hospitals by name, city, and state is available in Appendix B.
Discussion
When describing a population there are numerous definitions of rural, frontier,
and remote that can be used. Access to a hospital is one factor that is used to determine
the rurality of a population. The hospitals themselves have not been described in relation
to their proximity to each other, although hospital density has been described in relation
to competition and hospital behavior (Garnick et al., 1987; Schlesinger & Gray, 2006;
Tay, 2003). This paper seeks to create a definition of remoteness for hospital based in
clinical practice. All of the hospitals located 100 miles or more from the next hospital are
also 60 minutes or more apart. In essence, the distance can be accounted for and
incorporated into the travel time measure. Patient outcomes in cases of trauma, stroke,
myocardial infarction, and heat stroke are improved when definitive care is received
within one hour. Based on this clinical measure, it seems most appropriate to use the 60
minute travel time between hospitals to identify and describe a facility as remote.
Not all of the hospitals identified here are remote are located in rural counties as
defined by RUCC. For example, the hospital in Cumberland Maryland in Allegany
County, which is classified as RUCC 3, metro less than 250,000 people is about 65
minutes away by car from the nearest in-state hospital due to mountain roads.
It is important to note the exclusion of CAHs in this analysis. It would be a
mistake to assume that access to acute care does not exist in closer proximity to these
remote hospitals. However this was necessary because the purpose of this study was to
define remote IPPS hospitals as a specific classification of hospital to be used in future
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research. Further analysis is required to better understand the relationships between the
CAHs and the IPPS hospitals to which they transfer their more acutely ill patients. In
terms of payment reform models it is necessary to exclude the CAHs since they generally
follow different payment formulas.
Deeper examination is required to fully understand the difference in service
provided by CAHs and remote hospitals, especially those that are small enough to qualify
as a CAH. Comparison of the services provided at remote hospitals and the quality of the
care they provide may provide insight into their decision to remain an IPPS hospital. This
would also provide information about health care in rural communities.
In this analysis, the assumption was made that transfers do not occur across state
lines. In reality, transfers for tertiary and trauma care do occur across states lines.
Identifying the hospitals that are remote within their state creates a starting point for
analyzing transfer patterns. Further analysis is also needed in terms of their resources,
finances, patient outcomes, and networking patterns.
Conclusion
Remote hospitals among those participating in IPPS are best identified as those
that are 60 minutes or more from the next nearest in-state IPPS hospital. They can
provide definitive care for a variety of complex medical conditions. However, there are
going to be situations in which patients are transferred to a distant facility. It is important
to be able to identify these hospitals so that future research can focus on the care they
provide and the environment in which they operate. An examination of the extent to
which remoteness by this definition affects reimbursement penalties or incentives under
Hospital Value Based Purchasing will be covered in a separate manuscript.
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Table 1
ORHP/USDA criteria for Frontier and Remote (FAR)
Time to UA
Population

≥50,000
people

Time to UA

Time to UA

25,000-

10,000-

49,999

24,999

people

people

Level 1

≤ 50,000

≥ 60 minutes

Level 2

≤ 25,000

≥ 60 minutes

≥ 45 minutes

Level 3

≤ 10,000

≥ 60 minutes

≥ 45 minutes

≥30 minutes

≥ 60 minutes

≥ 45 minutes

≥30 minutes

Level 4

Time to UA
2,500-9,999
people

≥ 15 minutes
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Table 2
2013 Rural-Urban Continuum Codes
Code

Code Description
Metro Counties

1

Population: 1 million or more

2

Population: 250,000 to 1 million

3

Population: fewer than 250,000
Non-metro counties

4

Urban population: 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metro area

5

Urban population: 20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metro area

6

Urban population: 2,500 to 19,999, adjacent to a metro area

7

Urban population: 2,500 to 19,999, not adjacent to a metro area

8

Urban population: less than 2,500, adjacent to a metro area

9

Urban population: less than 2,500, not adjacent to a metro area
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Table 3- Summary Table of Rural Classification Methodology
Agency/ Organization

Naming
Scheme

Rural/Frontier
Classification

Geographic
Area

Population

US Census Bureau

N/A

Rural

not specified

<2,500

US Department of Argriculture
(USDA)

Urban
Influence
Codes

non-metro

county

not specified

no MSA (metro area) in the
county

USDA

RUCC

non-metropolitan
Codes 4-9

county

<2,500 to >
20,000

adjacent/non-adjacent to
metro area

Office of Rural Health Policy (ORHP)
& USDA

FAR

level 1-4

not specified

<50,000

travel time and distance to
UAs of varying size

Affordable Care Act (ACA)

N/A

frontier

square mile

<6

and "excessive" travel
time/distance to healthcare

California Office of Statewide Health
Planning & Development

N/A

frontier

square mile

<11

no UA "in the area"

Rural Health Research Center (RHRC)

RUCA

code 10

census tract

N/A

based on commuting
patterns to UAs

Center for Rural Health and Office of
Advancement of Teleheath
Methodology

N/A

frontier

zip code

N/A

>60 minutes or 60 miles to a
hospital with >75 beds

Health and Human Services (HHS)

N/A

frontier

square mile

<6

assigned by county

Other Criteria
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Figure 1
Remote Hospitals by Distance and Travel Time
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Figure 2
All IPPS Hospitals in the US
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Chapter 4: Results of Hospital Value Based Purchasing Analysis
Hospital Value Based Purchasing (HVBP) is a pay for performance (P4P)
program mandated by the Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010. HVBP is the primary
mechanism under the ACA to incorporate P4P in the context of Medicare reimbursement.
The overall purpose is to provide financial incentives and penalties for hospitals to
improve the quality of care they deliver. Over 3500 hospitals in the United States are
required to participate in the program. HVBP ranks all hospitals based on quality scores
for processes and outcomes of care. This potentially puts each hospital in competition
with every other hospital in the program. Large scale analysis of the program does not
provide information that is useful to hospital administrators or policy makers in
improving patient outcomes and hospital quality. This is why it is important to analyze
and understand how unique sets of hospitals fare in the program and determine factors
that lead to failure and success.
Literature Review
Public dissatisfaction with managed care along with new federal attention to
quality in the late 1980’s set the stage for changes in payment systems (Rodwin, 2010).
The first pay for performance (P4P) program was the Quality Care Compensation System
created by the private insurer U.S. Healthcare in 1987. Subsequently, P4P experiments
appeared in limited numbers in the early 1990’s among other private payers and in some
state Medicaid programs (Rosenthal et al., 2004). These programs expanded and
proliferated in the private sector in the early 2000’s (Damberg, et al, 2014) and continue
to be a part of the reimbursement structure for many private insurance companies.

69
The Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration (HQID) program served
as the demonstration project for HVBP. The HQID was a partnership between CMS and
Premier Inc. (an organization of not-for-profit hospitals) that was initially authorized for
three years (2003—2006) and subsequently extended for an additional 3 years ending in
2009. HQID provided incentive payments totaling $12 million annually to hospitals
based on a combination of process and outcome measures (CMS.gov, 2011). According
to CMS, the 216 hospitals that participated in the demonstration improved quality over
the six years of the demonstration. However, the metric used by CMS was an aggregate
score based on all process and outcome measures and thus could not, for example,
distinguish improved outcomes from improvements in documentation of care or changes
in methods for estimating adjusted mortality rates. A research review conducted by
Petersen et al (2006) found significant evidence for “gaming” or manipulation in the
reporting of process measures, as well as overall improved compliance with
documentation of care rather than improvements in care provided. Changes in the
calculation of adjusted mortality rates are similar to the up-coding that occurred in the
first years of the New York CABG (coronary artery bypass graft) surgery reporting
system (NY CSRS) (Epstein, 2006). Ryan (2009) found no significant decrease in 30–day
mortality for acute myocardial infarction, heart failure, and pneumonia from 2000 to
2006, suggesting that patient outcomes did not actually improve over that interval.
Research on quality improvement created by P4P has had mixed results in the
areas of quality improvement and cost efficiency. In 2014 RAND Health published a
review of value-based purchasing (VBP) programs including P4P programs (Damberg et
al., 2014). That analysis incorporated expert opinion from a technical expert panel (TEP)
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of VBP program administrators, hospital leaders who implement these programs, and
healthcare researchers. Based on the TEP and a limited number of studies, Damberg et al.
identified five aspects of VBP programs that appear to be associated with success: 1)
sizeable incentives, 2) similar measure across VBP programs unless specific population
are better served by other measures, 3) provider engagement, 4) incentives for both
achievement and improvement, and 5) support for providers in management of the
quality data.
This RAND report also identified possible undesirable side effects of P4P which
included “gaming” of data, ignoring quality of care in areas not being reported on,
overtreatment of patients, and avoidance of sicker or socially challenged patients. There
were 21 studies reviewed that related to such unintended consequences of P4P (e. g.,
Beaulieu & Horrigan, 2005; Glickman et al., 2007 as cited in Damberg er al, 2014), but
no significant unintended effects of P4P were found in any of the studies. Five of the
studies reviewed by Damberg et al. evaluated possible spillover effects of P4P on quality
measures not included in the incentive programs (e. g., Mullen, Frank, & Rosenthal,
2010, as cited in Damberg et al, 2014), but most of the studies were of small-scale or
short-duration programs, and no net beneficial spillover was found (i.e., non-incentivized
measures improved in some cases and in others they declined). To date, this type of study
has not been done on CMS P4P data. Damberg et al. found no quality studies that showed
a reduction in health disparities or improved care outcomes for disadvantaged groups
attributable to P4P.
Notably missing from the literature are the strategies used for success and details
regarding processes from providers who are high achievers in P4P. Members of the
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Damberg et al. (2014) TEP stated that anecdotal information is frequently shared at trade
conferences, but there are no reliable published data in this area. Damberg et al.
concluded that continued quantitative analysis of VBP programs is necessary to monitor
outcome. They also point out a need for qualitative research to better identify key
components that program administrators and other key personnel believe contribute to
success in VBP programs.
Hospital Value Based Purchasing Program (HVBP)
The ACA prescribes the HVBP in detail. All hospitals paid under the Inpatient
Prospective Payment System (IPPS), except those designated as Critical Access Hospitals
(CAHs), are required to participate and face adjustment to their Medicare payments as
long as they meet minimum case numbers. The ACA mandated that the program would
apply to all payments to hospitals for discharges occurring after October 1, 2012 based
initially on benchmarking quality data collected in 2010. The first three years of the
program include domains made up of processes of care measures, mortality measures,
outcome measures, and an efficiency measure. The quality domains included in scoring
change for each year from FY 13 to FY 15. For each performance measure, the raw score
is assigned points. Points are awarded for achievement based on how a given hospital
compares with all other hospitals and for improvement in how the hospital compares to
its previous reporting period or, in the case of the first year of a measure, the
benchmarking period. The higher score for each measure (i.e., for achievement or
improvement) is used in calculating the domain score. Each domain score is weighted
and then added together to create the TPS. The hospitals are then ranked by TPS score.
Program details can be found in Appendix C.
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For FY13 hospital could receive an incentive or penalty adjustment based on the
HVBP score of up to 1% on all Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) billed to Medicare. In
FY 14 the percentage change increased to 1.25% and in FY15 the payment adjustment
increased again to 1.5%. The ACA caps the adjustment at 2% in FY17. (There are also
financial consequences for hospitals based on readmission rates and Hospital Acquired
Infections (HAI); however, in this study only the HVBP program will be evaluated.)
The ACA requires that the total amount paid out in incentive payments equal the
total withheld in penalties. To that end, a linear exchange function is applied that
represents the relationship between a hospital’s TPS and the amount of money they
receive. The linear exchange function ensures a near perfect correlation between TPS and
the size of the incentive or penalty.
In order to participate in HVBP, hospitals must meet minimum case numbers for
each domain. In FY13 and FY14, they had to meet the minimum case number for all of
the domains in order to participate. However, in FY15 if the hospital met case numbers
for at least two of the four domains they were eligible to participate in HVBP. (Domains
in which they do not have enough case numbers to qualify were weighted and
redistributed to the other domains in the TPS.)
Process Measures Domain
Hospitals have been reporting process measures to CMS annually since 2004
These measures are also used by the Joint Commission, the Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality, and the National Quality Forum. There are currently 13 process
measures used in HVBP. The raw score is based on the number of cases in which each
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process was required and documented was completed. Hospitals must have 10 cases in at
least 3 process measures in order to qualify to participate in HVBP.
Outcome Domain
In FY14 hospitals had to have enough qualifying cases in two of the three
outcome measures (only the mortality measures were included in the outcome domain in
FY14) in order to participate in HVBP. For FY15 hospitals had to have enough cases in
at least 3 of the 5 measures (with each mortality measures counting as an individual
measure) in order to have the outcome measure included in the TPS. These measures
report on adverse events, therefore a lower value is an indication of better quality.
Mortality Measure
Three measures of mortality were added to FY14 HVBP to measure the outcome
of hospitalization for patients. Hospitals are awarded achievement or improvement
points based on the percentage of patients that survive 31 days or more following
discharge from the hospital. Hospitals must have at least 10 cases (discharges) in two of
the measures in order to qualify for HVBP. Mortality is reported using a risk adjusted
mortality measure which is the ratio of predicted deaths to expected deaths (CMS, 2014).
The predicted death value is calculated using a hierarchical linear regression model that
includes actual deaths, patient risk factors, and hospital specific effects or case mix. The
expected death value is based on the national performance of hospitals with the same case
mix. This value is then multiplied by the crude national ratio of observed deaths to
expected deaths. These values are calculated by CMS to assure consistency and accuracy,
and also because hospitals do not have access to the national data on which the
calculations are based (CMS, 2007).
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AHRQ Measures PSI-90
The AHRQ Patient Safety Indicator (PSI-90) composite score was added to
HVBP for FY15. This measure is based on eight measures of patient safety and is
reported as a ratio; the lower the ratio the better the quality. Similar to mortality rates,
scoring for each measure involves a complex calculation by CMS which includes the
observed rate of the event, the expected rate, and the population average. Additionally
scores are also weighted based on the size of the hospital. Hospitals must have a
minimum of 3 cases on any of the indicators in order to qualify with this measure.
Central Line Associated Blood Stream Infections (CLABSI)
The CLABSI measure is another outcome measure that was added to HVBP for
FY15 and reported as HAI-1. Hospitals are awarded achievement and improvement
points based on the percentage of patients with central venous catheters that contract
blood stream infections. Hospitals must have at least one predicted CLABSI in order to
qualify with this measure. This prediction is based on the national average central line
infection rate. For example if the national average CLABSI rate is 0.01, the hospital
would need 100 patients with a central line in order to have one predicted infection. If
they have fewer than 100 patients with a central line, they do not qualify for this measure.
Patient Experience of Care Domain
The patient experience of care domain is measured using the Hospital Consumer
Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) survey. This survey can be
used by itself or attached to any other survey of patient satisfaction a hospital uses. The
surveys can be distributed to a portion or all patients discharged from the hospital. The
survey was developed by CMS and AHRQ; it has been endorsed by the NQF. The survey
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has been in use since 2006, and the results have been publicly reported since 2008. The
survey itself consists of 32 questions in eight domains together with demographic
information about the patient. Most questions are scaled by estimated frequency of
occurrence (never, sometimes, usually, always). The score for each domain is based on
the percentage of items rated as always. Scores are adjusted to account for mode of
survey, such as telephone or mail, and for case-mix to account for comorbidities and
illness of patients. The experience of care domain was weighted as 30% of the TPS in
FY13, FY14, and FY15. Hospitals must have at least 100 surveys collected during the
measurement period in order to qualify for HVBP in FY13 and FY14 or use this domain
in their TPS for FY15.
Efficiency Domain
Hospital efficiency is measured through Medicare Spending per Beneficiary
(MSPB). This is calculated by dividing the hospital MSPB by the national average
MSPB. These MSPBs include all charges accrued by a patient three days prior to and 30
post admission to an acute care hospital. The charges are adjusted to eliminate
adjustments to DRG based on Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments,
teaching hospital status, and local cost of living adjustments. The charges are also
modified based on case-mix index to account for hospitals treating sicker patients. The
hospital receives a score in which a lower number is better. The hospital must have at
least 25 episodes of care in order to qualify to use this domain in their TPS. This factor is
only included in the TPS for FY15.
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Methods
In this study remote hospitals are defined as hospitals that are 60 minutes or more
driving time from the next nearest hospital (N = 127) and constituted the sampling frame.
Of the 127 remote hospitals, 90 (71%) had enough cases to receive a penalty or bonus
adjustment in all three years of the HVBP program. Among non-remote hospitals 2582
out of 3271 hospitals (2014 CMS file) (79%) received penalties or bonuses in all three
years of the HVBP program. Table 1provides a summary of these hospitals. A complete
list of the remote hospitals and how many years they qualified to participate in the
program can be found in Appendix D. Figure 1 is a map of the 90 hospitals which
participated in all three years of HVBP. The percent adjustment that each hospital
experienced each year was downloaded from CMS.gov (website). The HVBP total
performance scores, the domain scores, and the quality scores that compose each domain
were downloaded from the Hospital Compare archives
(www.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare). The hospital characteristics of ownership
type/profit status, number of beds, and DSH adjustment (FY15) as a proxy for patient
socioeconomics were also obtained from CMS.gov databases.
Data Analysis
Data were compiled in Microsoft Excel and analyzed using IBM SPSS Statistics
(version 23). Repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) (p<.05, Bonferroni
correction) was used to compare changes over the three year period in payment
adjustment, TPS, and the raw scores for each of the performance measures for the remote
hospital group, the non-remote hospital group and variance between the two groups. A
multiple regression analysis was used to compare the payment adjustments with hospital

77
factors for each of the three years for the remote hospital group. Non-profit hospitals
were used as the reference category for the ownership type.
Results
The results of the repeated measures ANOVA for payment adjustments for are
presented in Table 2. For remote hospitals the mean change from negative to positive
adjustments to payments is statistically significant (p< .05) with a very large effect size of
37.6%. The average of payment adjustments made within the program must equal 0%,
however this analysis only included hospitals that were eligible for adjustment in all three
years so the mean adjustment is slightly different from zero in the non-remote hospital
group. For non-remote hospitals the mean change from negative to positive adjustments
to payments is statistically significant (p< .05) with a medium effect size of 1.7%. There
is a significant difference (p< .05) in mean payment adjustments over time between the
two groups, with a medium effect size of 3.4%.
The results of the repeated measures ANOVA for TPS for remote and non-remote
hospitals are presented in Table 3. The decrease in the remote hospitals mean TPS is
statistically significant (p< .05) with a large effect size of 17.2%. The decrease in the
non-remote hospitals mean TPS is also significant (p< .05) with a very large effect size of
40.9%. There is a significant difference (p< .05) between the mean TPS over time
between the two group (p <.05) with a small effect size of 1.7%.
The results of the repeated measures ANOVA for performance measures for
remote hospitals and the comparison of the remote to non-remote hospitals are presented
in Tables 4. Within the remote hospital group there are statistically significant difference
for three process measures, SCIP Inf-1 (p <.05, effect size 8.5%), SCIP Inf-2 (p <.05,
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effect size 5.4%), and SCIP INF-9 (P <.05, effect size 17.4%). There was only a
statistically different change in outcome measures for 30-day mortality for AMI (p< .05,
effect size 7.2%). Unfortunately this represented an increase in the raw mortality score of
.004. For the non-remote hospital group all of the measures except SCIP VTE-1 changed
significantly over time (p < .05) with very small to medium effect sizes (ranging from
.3% to 9.8%). When compared to non-remote hospitals there were statistically significant
differences for SCIP Inf-1 (p< .05, effect size 0.3%) and SCIP Inf-2 (P<.05, effect size
0.4%). It is worth noting that very small effect sizes may be a results of the sample size
and may not represent meaningful differences between the groups or even within the nonremote hospital group.
The results of the multiple regression model analyzing the influence of hospital
characteristics on positive payment adjustment are presented in Table 5. The hospital
characteristics used only predict 10.3% of increase payments at best (FY15). None of the
characteristics were a statistically significant predictor of positive payment adjustment for
more than one year. Only the regression model for FY15 was significant and bed size was
the most significant predictor of success. More interesting is that these characteristics
taken as a whole increased predictability of success for each year, from 1.5% in FY13 to
2.3% in FY14 and 10.3% in FY15. This suggests that certain characteristics may help
hospitals adapt to the HVBP program and be predictive of success.
Discussion
There are a variety of factors to consider when assessing the impact of HVBP.
One factor to consider is the impact on hospitals and their payments. This can be assessed
through the payment adjustment percentage that hospitals receive. From a financial
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perspective, hospitals are performing well if they receive a positive payment adjustment
and conversely they are performing poorly if their payments are negatively adjusted.
Remote hospitals performed less well in FY 14 than in FY 13, but overall improved over
the 3 year period with a positive change in the mean payment adjustment of 0.26%. The
non-remote hospitals performed the best in FY13 and decreased in FY14. They improved
in FY15 but still decreased 0.046% during the three year period.
While payments increased for the remote hospitals during the study period, the
TPS for remote hospitals decreased by 13.3%. For non-remote hospitals the TPS
decreased by 27.2%. Comparing the TPS to the payment adjustment a 13.9% difference
in TPS accounted for a 0.306% difference in payment. Comparing these variations is
confounded by the changing percentage available for adjustment each year and the
changes in domains and their weighting in each of the three years of the program.
Another factor to consider is the quality of care received by patients. The changes
from one year to the next are minimal and not always indicative of improvement. A very
small difference in score can results in a very large difference in points awarded. Even a
decrease in the raw score can result in an increase in points awarded for a particular
measure. Particularly in a small hospital, a single patient can dramatically change the
number of points awarded. For example, in the remote hospital group there was a the
large increase in points awarded for the outcome measures (16.06 from FY14 to FY15)
which does not correlate to a statistically significant decrease in mortality, the only
outcome measures used in both years. In fact, there was a statistically significant increase
in mortality for acute myocardial infarctions in the remote hospital group. Without
firsthand knowledge of each hospital it is also difficult to determine if the improvements
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in SCIP Inf-1, SCIP Inf-2, and SCIP Inf-9 are actually an improvement in the
administration of the right antibiotic at the right time and the removal of urinary catheters
on time in surgical patients or simply an improvement in documentation practices. It is
likely a combination of practice change and documentation changes which may or may
not improve the overall care delivered from the clinical perspective.
Of the hospital factors assessed in this study, none of them were a consistent
predictor of performance. In only one year was hospital ownership a statistically
significant predictor. Likewise, in only one year the size of the hospital was a statistically
significant predictor of performance. However, the factors together increased nearly tenfold in their predictive power over three years. This suggests that certain characteristics
may enable hospitals to be more adaptive to this program in order to be successful. It is
important to note that the characteristics used were limited and there may be other
hospital characteristics and resources that have a greater influence on performance. The
inverse relationship of bed size to payment adjustment may indicate that smaller hospitals
adapt easier to the program although it could also represent a bias in the formula.
The FY 15 TPS also includes new measures such as the efficiency measure. All of
the hospitals included in this study received an efficiency score. The average efficiency
score for the non-remote hospitals was 0.92 and the average efficiency score for the nonremote hospitals was 0.992, which indicates that the remote hospitals provide care at a
lower cost. This efficiency metric accounts for 20% of the TPS and also explains some of
the overall performance differences between the remote and non-remote hospitals. In FY
15 the process measures also only account for 20% of the TPS. Even significant
improvement in these measures is unlikely to result in significant payment increases.
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Another factor to note with this program is the variation in the measurement
periods used for the domains to determine the TPS for each fiscal year. The
measurements used for FY15 come from four different measurement periods (Appendix
C). Different patient encounters are being used for single score and changes made within
an organization will not be reflected in every component of the TPS.
Conclusion
The improved performance of this unique group of hospitals has many
implications. First, this group of remote hospitals that are far from the usual supply of
resources has performed better than the average US hospital in this program. Overall they
are succeeding from a financial perspective. However, their improved financial
performance in light of minimal increases in quality measures indicates that nationally
quality is not significantly improving. The primary purpose of this program is to drive
quality, which it has failed to do. This is not surprising considering that the HQID on
which this program was based also failed to produce results in the area of improved
patient outcomes (Jha, Joynt, Orav, & Epstein, 2012; Ryan, 2009). Continued analysis of
this program is required as it moves forward to assess the impact on both hospital
finances and patient outcomes. In depth analysis of specific types of hospitals is
necessary to understand the program effects, quality improvement, and best practices
moving forward.

82

Table 1- Hospitals Summary of Location, Size, Distance, and Travel Time
Remote Hospitals
Range in
Mean
Range in
Number of
Number of
distance
Beds
Beds
(miles)

Census Bureau
Region

Number of
Hospitals

Mountain West
West North Central
Pacific West
South Atlantic
West South Central
East North Central

45
27
19
10
9
8

7-406
8-216
26-172
26-300
26-160
34-349

New England
Middle Atlantic
East South Central

4
2
1

64-352
63-287
36

Mean
Distance

Range in
Travel
Time

Mean
Travel
Time (min)

31-247.2
49.19-168.87
46-312.5
43.87-136.18
42.9-111.17
45.16-94.39

67.74
58.24
66.6
48.53
63.16
71.2

60.4-248.1
60.4-182.1
62.7-479.9
62.6-169-2
60-120.1
64.9-132.1

97.6
73.4
85.6
70.6
70.5
92.7

91
42.79-55.06
175
46.98-48.18
N/A
38.49
Non-Remote Hospitals
Mountain West
191
1-688
174
.01-52.97
West North Central
243
3-1212
165
.02-54.7
Pacific West
386
6-851
202
.14-45.1
South Atlantic
572
3-2334
220
.07-55.3
West South Central
543
1-1048
145
.004-57.1
East North Central
503
6-1251
182
.02-55.8
New England
138
17-1216
191
.11-42.9
Middle Atlantic
377
4-1991
242
.03-43.2
East South Central
316
1-1231
159
.05-42.3
*excludes 2 remote and 2 non-remote hospitals that were not mapped

50.5
47.58
N/A

60.1-68.2
60.1-62.64
64.04

62.6
61.4
N/A

9.4
13.5
6.7
12.7
11.5
9.8
9.7
8.6
16

.03-58
.05-59
.4-58.3
.2-59.5
.007-59.38
.03-59.8
.3-59.6
.13-48.4
.11-22.1

14.3
18.6
11.7
18.9
15.8
15.4
16.7
14.8
22.1

56
60
51
107
45
94
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Table 2- Repeated Measures ANOVA of Payment Adjustments for Remote and NonRemote Hospitals in Hospital Value-Based Purchasing

Remote Hospitals
Mean adjustment
p-value (model)
within subjects effect size of time
n (3 years reported)
Remote Hospitals
Mean adjustment
p-value (model)
within subjects effect size of time

2013
-0.08%
0.000
37.6%

2015
0.18%

2014
-0.024%

2015
-0.04%

90
2013
0.006%
0.000
1.7%

n (3 years reported)

2582

within subjects group*time
interaction effect size

3.4%

p < .05 shown in bold

2014
-0.16%
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Table 3- Repeated Measures ANOVA of Total Performance Scores for Remote and NonRemote Hospitals in Hospital Value-Based Purchasing

Remote Hospitals
Mean Total Performance Score
p-value (model)

2013
50.112
0.000

within subjects effect size of time
n (3 years reported)

17.2%
90

Remote Hospitals
Mean Total Performance Score
p-value (model)

2013
54.764
0.000

within subjects effect size of time
n (3 years reported)

40.9%
2582

within subjects group*time
interaction effect size

1.7%

p < .05 shown in bold

2014
41.784

2015
43.451

2014
46.806

2015
39.859
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Table 4- Repeated Measures ANOVA of Process and Outcome Measures for Remote and Non-Remote Hospitals and a Comparison of
Remote and Non-remote Hospitals
Mean scores Remote Hospitals
Mean scores Non-remote Hospitals
Remote vs Non-remote
2014

2015

pvalue

effect
size

n

2013

2014

2015

pvalue

effect
size

p-value

group*time
effect size

SCIP-Inf-1

87 0.972 0.972

0.984

0.003

8.5%

2519

0.981

0.984

0.987

0.00

1.8%

0.015

0.3%

SCIP-Inf-2

87 0.978 0.979

0.987

0.002

5.4%

2517

0.982

0.984

0.988

0.00

2.9%

0.178

0.1%

SCIP-Inf-3

87 0.968 0.968

0.975

0.158

2.5%

2513

0.97

0.973

0.977

0.00

3%

0.672

0.0%

SCIP-Inf-4

17 0.944

0.96

0.964

0.072

18.7%

1075

0.957

0.962

0.968

0.00

4.5%

0.537

0.1%

SCIP-Inf-9

86

0.933

0.966

0.000

17.4%

2494

0.954

0.97

0.00

9.8%

0.001

0.4%

AMI-8

26

0.915

0.939

0.265

6.1%

1266

0.942

0.954

0.961

0.00

3.7%

0.362

0.2%

SCIP-Card-2

80 0.951 0.957

0.966

0.087

4.7%

2397

0.96

0.97

0.973

0.00

1%

0.899

0.0%

SCIP-VTE-1

90 0.959 0.969

0.077

3.5%

2573

0.979

0.98

0.88

0%

0.692

0.0%

SCIP-VTE-2

90 0.953 0.962

0.966

0.128

8.8%

2563

0.969

0.973

0.978

0.00

0.3%

0.932

0.0%

PN-3b

89 0.965 0.969

0.972

0.100

2.1%

2548

0.974

0.977

0.979

0.00

1.5%

0.744

0.0%

PN-6

88 0.936 0.937

0.944

0.576

0.7%

2554

0.955

0.96

0.963

0.00

1.7%

0.738

0.0%

HF-1

87 0.879 0.893

0.905

0.174

2.2%

2560

0.926

0.935

0.947

0.00

1.4%

0.822

0.0%

n

2013

0.91
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Table 4 (cont.)
Mean scores Remote Hospitals
n
MORT-30-AMI 85

2013

Mean scores Non-remote Hospitals

2015

pvalue

effect
size

n

0.852 0.856

0.012

7.2%

2014

Remote vs Non-remote

2015

pvalue

effect
size

p-value

group*time
effect size

2541

0.854 0.855

0.012

0.3%

0.077

0.1%

2013

2014

MORT-30-HF

90

0.88

0.878

0.301

1.2%

2581

0.878 0.879

0.00

3.6%

0.403

0.0%

MORT-30-PN

90

0.878 0.878

0.959

0.0%

2580

0.882 0.884

0.00

0.6%

0.522

0.0%

SCIP Inf-1: pre-operative antibiotic at the right time, SCIP Inf-2: right pre-operative antibiotic given, SCIP Inf-3: peri-operative antibiotics
stopped at the right time, SCIP Inf-4: cardiac surgery patients with good blood sugar control, SCIP Inf-9: urinary catheters removed by second
post-operative day, AMI 8a: heart attack patients received percutaneous coronary intervention within 90 minutes, SCIP Card 2: surgery patients
were kept on their beta blockers, SCIP VTE-1: surgery patients were ordered blood clot prevention, SCIP VTE-2: patients received treatment to
prevent blood clots at the right time, PN-3b: pneumonia patients had blood cultures drawn prior to antibiotic administration, PN-6: Pneumonia
patients received the right antibiotics, HF-1: heart failure patients received discharge instructions, MORT-30-AMI: 30 day mortality for heart
attack patients, MORT-30-HF: 30 day mortality rate for heart failure, MORT-30-PN: 30 day mortality rate for pneumonia. SCIP Inf-9, SCIP VTE1, and the mortality measures only have 2 years of reporting. None of the hospitals have reported on AMI-7a: heart attack patients given
fibrinolytic medication within 30 minutes. p < .05 shown in bold.
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Table 5- Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting HVBP Payments in Remote Hospitals (N=90)

FY 2013

Variable

B

SE B

Constant

-.021

.059

Number of Beds

.043

.069

-647.41

DSH Factor

For-Profit
Government owned

FY 2014

β

B

SE B

FY 2015

β

B

SE B

β

.469

.094

*

-.143

-.233

.111

-.384

-.064

.064

.118

-.057

.076

423.68

-.294

166.43

464.88

.069

59.37

678.18

.016

-.043

.091

-.52

-.027

.100

-.029

-.163

.146

-.116

-.092

.068

-.147

-.178

.075

-.257

-.94

.109

-.089

R²

.059

.067

.143

Adjusted R²

.015

.023

.103

F

1.33

1.522

3.55

p < .05 shown in bold; non-profit hospitals are the reference category for ownership type
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Figure 1
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Chapter 5: Summary of Research
Improving the quality and value of hospital care and outcomes for patients has
been a focus for hospitals, regulators, and insurers for nearly 30 years (Damberg et al.,
2014; Rodwin, 2010; Rosenthal et al., 2004). Despite the lack of improvement in
outcomes during the six years of the Premier Hospital Quality Improvement
Demonstration (HQID) (Ryan, 2009), Hospital Value Based Purchasing (HVBP) closely
mimics the HQID and was written into law in the Affordable Care Act with the intent of
improving quality and value. Large scale analysis of the program has primarily been
based on comparing hospitals on payment adjustments, total performance scores, and
achievement or improvement points awarded or by grouping hospitals into large
categories, such as small urban, small rural, or safety net hospitals (Government
Accountability Office, 2015).
This study was designed to 1) define the remote hospitals as a unique group of
hospitals using mapping software and clinical evidence for the best patient outcomes
related to distance and time to treatment, 2) evaluate the performance of the remote
hospitals compared to non-remote hospitals and assess if quality and outcomes have
improved during the first three years of HVBP, and 3) evaluate the influence of hospital
characteristics on performance in HVBP.
Hospital economic behavior has been studied for nearly five decades with interest
in the comparison of not-for-profit (NFP) and for-profit hospitals beginning with
Newhouse’s landmark model of the NFP hospital as a firm (Newhouse, 1970). However,
none of the current models of hospital economic behavior have been shown to be
accurate when subjected to large scale testing. Few models have been created which
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include nursing resources. One model which does includes nursing only included the
percentage of nursing staff who were RNs and did not treat nursing as a major
contributing resource or influencing factor in hospital performance (Bazzoli et al., 2007).
In Chapter 2 several theories that describe hospital and firm behavior are reviewed and
synthesized. The comparative advantage theory of competition (Hunt & Morgan, 1995)
provides a framework for this review and is adapted to hospitals. The concepts reviewed
include resources, quality output, and financial performance. HVBP is a program based
on quality output with financial rewards. The analysis of remote hospitals and their
performance in HVBP includes a model which treats hospital resources as a factor for
performance.
There is no single economic model that describes the performance and behavior
of hospitals. This paper suggests nursing factors which have been previously neglected as
a possible key to predicting hospital performance. A manuscript describing this review of
theories and discussing the lack of nursing as a significant hospital factor for performance
will be submitted to Nursing Economic$. The nursing resources and factors considered
here include nurse to bed ratios, hospital based nurse educators, years of experience, and
education level.
Remote hospitals occupy a unique position in HVBP. Isolated hospitals which
have not had competition from nearby hospitals in the past are now competing with every
other IPPS hospital in the country. Chapter 3 of this study describes how Geographic
Information Systems (GIS) was used to map all Inpatient Prospective Payment System
(IPPS) hospitals and then determine the next nearest hospital to each one. Using clinical
evidence for best patient outcomes, remote hospitals were defined as those hospitals that
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are 60 minutes or more driving time from the next nearest IPPS hospital. This is a
deviation from the original proposal for this study. Originally the distance between
hospitals was determined using straight line distances (as the crow flies). This method
identified 30 hospitals that were 100 miles or more apart. The realities of hospital access
are much better described using driving times to account for the variety of road
conditions that exist in rural America. Therefore, the methodology used to identify
remote hospitals was altered from the original proposal. A manuscript describing the
techniques used and the identification of these hospitals will be submitted to The Journal
for Rural Health.
The first three years of HVBP have not created substantial improvements in
quality and outcomes for patients. Remote hospitals have done well in the program,
increasing their payments over time and as a group receiving a bonus payment in the
third year. However, mortality rates have remained stagnant and in the case of acute
myocardial infarction have increased. So although this program did not adversely affect
this group of hospitals new to competition, it did not improve patient outcomes either.
None of the hospital characteristics that were considered in this study consistently
influenced the performance in HVBP. However, the influence of the hospital
characteristics on performance increased by ten-fold over the three year period, with
hospital size being the greatest factor of influence. These results are presented in Chapter
four and the manuscript will be submitted to a journal such as Health Services Research
for publication.
A definition for remote hospitals (n = 127) was created by using GIS and clinical
evidence. In this study, I found that remote hospitals were competitive with non-remote
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hospitals in the first three years of the HVBP program. However, I also found that
quality and outcomes did not improve for patients. None of the hospital characteristics
analyzed were strong predictors of success in the program. However, comparisons are
complicated by the addition of several new metrics in the third year which could not be
included in the analysis.
Identifying remote hospitals is only the first step in analyzing their role in rural
America and how rural Americans access care. Each paper raises questions and some of
these questions persist throughout the work as a whole.
This study originally proposed to answer five questions related to hospital
economic behavior and hospital value based purchasing. The ANOVA and regression
analyses directly answered two of the questions: have quality measures improved and do
non-profit hospitals have higher quality than non-profit hospitals. The question of
comparative advantage theory of competition applying to remote hospitals was partially
answered through the regression analysis of hospital characteristics. Because the analysis
conducted used ANOVA and mean scores, the question of improvement in response to
penalties and bonuses was not addressed for individual hospitals. Aspects of firm theory
were shown to apply to hospitals however the lack of a definitive model describing
hospital behavior and economic performance shows the complexity of answering this
question.
Limitations
There are numerous limitations to this study and three manuscripts. IPPS hospitals are not
the only hospitals providing acute care in rural America, but because Critical Access
Hospitals are not subject to HVBP incentives and penalties, they could not be included in
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an analysis focused on the impact of HVBP, limiting the assessment of distance to
hospitals only within state lines is a limitation because, especially in emergencies,
transfers of care across state lines may occur and for some individuals, the nearest
hospital may be in another state. No assessment of services provided at the remote
hospitals was conducted to determine how capable they are of treating specific acute
conditions, because those data are not included in the CMS datasets the were used for this
study. Due to these limitations, more questions are raised than can be answered regarding
the transfer patterns of patients in rural areas between CAHs, remote IPPS hospitals, and
tertiary care centers both within and outside of state boundaries.
Data from the fourth year of HVBP data have been released but were not included
in this analysis. Additional measures now have more than one year of data for
comparison. The large sample size of the non-remote hospitals may lead to statistically
significant changes in raw quality scores over time which are too small to be practically
meaningful. The variation in scores over time may also suffer from overall improvement.
As all hospitals improve their scores, the variability decreases and very small differences
in the raw scores may account for large difference in points earned and payment
adjustments.
Future Research
HVBP needs to continue to be monitored for the next several years for the overall
impact on the quality of care provided by hospitals. Over the next several years the
measurement periods coalesce for all the measures, so that the scores are all for the same
time period and patient encounters. The program needs to be looked at as a whole and
also for specific groups of hospitals to monitor for bias and advantage. At the same time,
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the analysis undertaken in this dissertation suggests that HVBP per se may not produce
sensitive enough indicators for comparing performance of remote hospitals as a subset of
all rural hospitals.
There is a significant amount of work to be done in completing the description of
remote hospitals. First the hospitals need to be described in terms of the services that they
provide, specifically interventional cardiology services, labor and delivery services and
other specialized care services (e.g., stroke). Actual transfer patterns between CAHs and
remote hospitals and between remote hospitals and other hospitals, including hospitals
across states lines, need to be mapped and analyzed. The frequency and reasons that
transfers from a CAH bypasses the nearest IPPS hospital for a larger regional hospital is
especially important to understand. Developing a new or better theory or model of
hospital behavior and performance might lead to identification of factors more relevant to
predicting hospital success than those analyzed in the present study.
Recommendations
Continued monitoring of raw quality scores will be needed in coming years in
order to truly assess if this program has an appreciable effect on quality and patient
outcomes. New measures of hospital resources need to be included in analysis to
determine factors that predict not only success in this program but the ability of a hospital
to provide high quality care that is of high value. Evaluating the performance of
specialized groups of hospitals and not just the entire group is also necessary to provide
insight into strengths and weaknesses of the program.
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Conclusions and Policy Implications
Hospitals in the US vary greatly in size, resources, and geography. The
complexity of the HVBP program reflects the difficulty of creating a national one-sizefits-all program to drive quality improvement and value in hospital care. Whether other
metrics might better reflect quality and value is a something that will require further
analysis and wider discussion. Hospitals need to be held to quality standards, but what is
quality and how is it measured are questions that have yet to be answered with industry
consensus.
The remote hospital group is a key component of further network analysis. First it
is necessary to look at the services provided by each hospital and determine if it is a
hospital that is referred to or referred from for key conditions such as acute myocardial
infarction, stroke, and trauma. Next, these hospitals can become part of a larger network
analysis focused on referral patterns between remote hospitals and from critical access
hospitals. These details are crucial to understanding access to acute care and future policy
development for rural America.
HVBP is a very complex program that is constantly evolving and changing. The
current CMS rule (42 CFR Part 412) proposes annual changes to the metrics used in
HVBP through 2021. Although it is understandable to remove metrics that have “topped
out” or reached a point where further improvement is unlikely, it also creates a moving
target for hospitals. This requires that resources be dedicated to complying with the
program, which diverts resources from patient care. In addition, the frequent changes to
the program complicate year to year comparisons of quality improvement. Alignment of
measurement periods is also necessary so that changes made within hospitals for quality
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improvement are reflected in all components in a single year of HVBP. This alignment is
slowly taking place and can be seen in the proposed rules for coming years.
It is also important to consider specialized groups of hospitals and evaluate their
performance in this program to ensure that negative bias has not crept into the program.
In the case that a specific group is performing poorly, it becomes necessary to determine
what characteristics these hospitals possess in order to either reevaluate the program or
assist hospitals in improving their care environments. As the policy develops and evolves
it must not become biased towards a specific group of hospitals.
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Appendix B
Remote Hospitals
Name
Fairbanks Memorial Hospital
St Alphonsus Medical Center
Northeastern Nevada Regional
Hospital
Regional West Medical Center
Bartlett Regional Hospital
Mt Edgecumbe Hospital
St Johns Medical Center
Nye Regional Medical Center
Yuma Regional Medical Center
Central Peninsula General Hospital
Berkeley Medical Center
Lower Keys Medical Center
Wyoming Medical Center
San Luis Valley Regional Medical
Center
St Luke's Magic Valley Rmc
St Joseph Regional Medical Center
Memorial Hospital Of Texas County
Gila Regional Medical Center
Northern Montana Hospital
Keefe Memorial Hospital
P H S Indian Hosp At Belcourt
Trinity Hospitals
Phs Indian Hospital At Rosebud
Campbell County Memorial Hospital
Sheridan Memorial Hospital
Evanston Regional Hospital
Memorial Hospital Sweetwater
County
P H S Indian Hospital At Browning
Portage Health
Great Plains Regional Medical Center
Chippewa County War Memorial
Hospital
Yampa Valley Medical Center
Palo Verde Hospital

City
Fairbanks
Ontario

Time
State (Min)
AK 479.85
OR 262.70

Distance
(MI)
322.342034
257.946787

Elko
Scottsbluff
Juneau
Sitka
Jackson
Tonopah
Yuma
Soldotna
Martinsburg
Key West
Casper

NV
NE
AK
AK
WY
NV
AZ
AK
WV
FL
WY

248.13
182.13
334.29
334.29
182.38
155.09
153.48
281.73
153.37
169.20
121.78

255.018815
174.18522
171.193487
171.193487
161.757734
161.604798
155.865145
144.558007
140.469304
126.67612
122.275365

Alamosa
Twin Falls
Lewiston
Guymon
Silver City
Havre
Cheyenne
Wells
Belcourt
Minot
Rosebud
Gillette
Sheridan
Evanston

CO
ID
ID
OK
NM
MT

121.07
116.13
130.57
120.12
116.57
108.53

119.46853
118.721286
115.930392
114.666384
112.685864
112.681057

CO
ND
ND
SD
WY
WY
WY

125.97
118.54
130.00
103.88
97.16
110.69
104.62

112.145689
105.36309
105.36309
103.726832
103.318533
103.318533
101.52335

WY
MT
MI
NE

92.67
144.26
132.12
106.87

101.52335
100.918304
97.361818
96.46

MI

105.02

92.7184352

CO
CA

106.78
90.44

90.7012759
90.3948678

Rock Springs
Browning
Hancock
North Platte
Sault Sainte
Marie
Steamboat
Springs
Blythe
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Bozeman Deaconess Hospital
Bay Area Hospital
Avera St Mary's Hospital
Phs Indian Hospital At Eagle Butte
Pecos County Memorial Hospital
Phs Indian Hospital At Pine Ridge
Dickinson County Memorial Hospital
Marquette General Hospital
Altru Hospital
Sutter Coast Hospital
Tuba City Regional Health Care
Corporation
Mercy Medical Center-North Iowa
Mena Regional Health System
Lea Regional Medical Center
Castleview Hospital
Mid Coast Hospital
Sierra Vista Regional Health Center
Childress Regional Medical Center
Payson Regional Medical Center
Olympic Medical Center
Avera Queen Of Peace
Mercy Medical Center
St James Healthcare
St Peter's Hospital
Samaritan Hospital
Standing Rock Indian Health Service
Hospital
Sky Lakes Medical Center
Blessing Hospital
Mt Graham Regional Medical Center
San Carlos Indian Hospital
Alpena Regional Medical Center
Share Memorial Hospital
Alta Vista Regional Hospital
Guadalupe County Hospital
Arkansas Valley Regional Medical
Center
Crownpoint Healthcare Facility
Valley View Hospital Association
Essentia Health St Joseph's Medical
Center
Hilo Medical Center
Sevier Valley Medical Center

Bozeman
Coos Bay
Pierre
Eagle Butte
Fort Stockton
Pine Ridge
Iron Mountain
Marquette
Grand Forks
Crescent City

MT
OR
SD
SD
TX
SD
MI
MI
ND
CA

97.56
131.98
101.81
155.06
83.11
104.28
96.94
98.23
77.72
94.11

87.1909444
87.0109276
82.6458177
82.6458177
82.5774909
80.7897204
80.4653789
80.4653789
76.3584683
75.1125909

Tuba City
Mason City
Mena
Hobbs
Price
Brunswick
Sierra Vista
Childress
Payson
Port Angeles
Mitchell
Dubuque
Butte
Helena
Moses Lake

AZ
IA
AR
NM
UT
OR
AZ
TX
AZ
WA
SD
OR
MT
MT
WA

115.80
87.49
84.78
84.86
81.09
74.56
77.29
70.47
101.80
95.28
78.38
75.65
70.68
65.46
78.65

75.0718678
74.4518307
74.0582992
73.9373243
72.064124
71.3637295
70.6962546
69.6483267
69.0474442
68.7475808
68.1822127
67.8753358
67.7497221
67.7497221
67.5889034

Fort Yates
Klamath Falls
Quincy
Safford
San Carlos
Alpena
Alva
Las Vegas
Santa Rosa

ND
OR
IL
AZ
AZ
MI
OK
NM
NM

103.58
85.57
88.56
119.15
119.53
76.64
73.52
64.02
95.75

67.2800137
66.5938024
66.4122128
65.2093822
65.2093822
65.1904478
65.1480612
64.9417466
64.94

La Junta
Crownpoint
Glenwood
Springs

CO
NM

82.15
114.14

64.8018877
64.0611845

CO

72.57

61.7052764

Detroit Lakes
Hilo
Richfield

MN
HI
UT

72.93
79.10
66.04

61.5156946
60.4375245
60.3931167

116
St Anthony Regional Hospital &
Nursing Home
Trinity Regional Medical Center
Sanford Worthington Medical Center
Ottumwa Regional Health Center
Hays Medical Center
South Lyon Medical Center
Sells Indian Health Service Hospital
Dhhs Usphs Indian Health Services
Brownwood Regional Medical Center
Murphy Medical Center Inc
Siouxland Surgery Center Lp
Ukiah Valley Medical
Center/Hospital D
Morton County Hospital
Southwest Medical Center
Banner Churchill Community
Hospital
Barton Memorial Hospital
Northeast Regional Medical Center
Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hospital
Hannibal Regional Hospital
Rutland Regional Medical Center
Havasu Regional Medical Center
Chinle Comprehensive Health Care
Facility
Fort Defiance Indian Hospital
Western Plains Medical Complex
Bay Area Med Ctr
Mayo Clinic Health SystemFairmont
Southeast Health Center Of Reynolds
County
Riverside Shore Memorial Hospital
Doctor's Memorial Hospital Inc
Bob Wilson Memorial Grant County
Hospital
Flagstaff Medical Center
Champlain Valley Physicians
Hospital Medical Ctr
Baxter Regional Medical Center
North Arkansas Regional Medical

Carroll
Fort Dodge
Worthington
Ottumwa
Hays
Yerington
Sells
San Fidel
Brownwood
Murphy
Dakota Dunes

IA
IA
MN
IA
KS
NV
AZ
NM
TX
NC
SD

73.38
73.50
66.25
73.41
65.85
64.66
64.38
65.49
64.82
78.11
66.94

60.0726734
60.0726734
59.9350238
59.9071123
59.8438237
59.5871556
59.535997
59.2556598
58.6234026
58.4512102
58.1890701

Ukiah
Elkhart
Liberal

CA
KS
KS

70.77
73.20
66.83

58.1461891
57.9753223
57.9753223

Fallon
South Lake
Tahoe
Kirksville
Lebanon
Hannibal
Rutland
Lake Havasu
City

NV

64.88

57.2260004

CA
MO
NH
MO
VT

74.26
64.41
68.20
68.70
64.47

56.9448828
56.9161481
56.7897056
56.2869313
55.3308652

AZ

62.41

53.512903

Chinle
Fort Defiance
Dodge City
Marinette

AZ
AZ
KS
WI

163.64
154.50
61.55
76.75

53.4153278
53.4153278
53.1432856
53.12049

Fairmont

MN

60.80

53.0817279

Ellington
Nassawadox
Perry

MO
VA
FL

65.08
75.06
69.56

52.5490054
51.8294399
51.0689679

Ulysses
Flagstaff

KS
AZ

60.39
76.99

50.7414217
50.4761496

Plattsburgh
Mountain
Home
Harrison

NY

60.06

49.6971462

AR
AR

61.50
60.41

49.3184746
49.3184746
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Center
Garrett County Memorial Hospital
Western Maryland Regional Medical
Center
Cheshire Medical Center
Camden Clark Medical Center
Kona Community Hospital
North Hawaii Community Hospital
Soldiers And Sailors Memorial
Hospital
Grays Harbor Community Hospital
Cheyenne Regional Medical Center
Ivinson Memorial Hospital
Lewisgale Hospital Alleghany
Munson Medical Center
Summersville Regional Medical
Center
Mccurtain Memorial Hospital
Central Vermont Medical Center
Kingman Regional Medical Center
George County Hospital
Northern Navajo Medical Center

Oakland

MD

64.75

49.0409433

Cumberland
Keene
Parkersburg
Kealakekua
Kamuela

MD
NH
WV
HI
HI

64.97
60.14
62.63
62.67
63.77

49.0409433
48.8450457
48.8171733
48.67
48.6720318

Wellsboro
Aberdeen
Cheyenne
Laramie
Low Moor
Traverse City

PA
WA
WY
WY
VA
MI

62.64
65.35
71.02
71.08
71.70
64.90

48.4625343
47.4644806
47.2064
47.2064
46.713291
46.5831495

Summersville
Idabel
Barre
Kingman
Lucedale
Shiprock

WV
OK
VT
AZ
MS
NM

67.15
60.05
60.79
60.99
64.14
60.44

45.2462091
44.2474205
44.1361403
39.9261445
39.7062843
31.9318393
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Appendix C
Process Measures

AMI-8a

Heart attack patients given fibrinolytic medication within
30 minutes of arrival.
Heart attack patients given percutaneous coronary
intervention (PCI) within 90 minutes of arrival.

HF-1

Heart failure patients given discharge instructions.

AMI-7a

PN-3b
PN-6

SCIP-Card-2

Pneumonia patients whose initial emergency room blood
culture was performed prior to the administration of the
first hospital dose of antibiotics.
Pneumonia patients given the most appropriate initial
antibiotic(s).
Surgery patients who were taking heart drugs called beta
blockers before coming to the hospital, who were kept on
the beta blockers during the period just before and after
their surgery.

SCIP-VTE-1

Surgery patients whose doctors ordered treatments to
prevent blood clots after certain types of surgeries.

SCIP-VTE-2

Patients who got treatment at the right time (within 24
hours before or after their surgery) to help prevent blood
clots after certain types of surgery.

SCIP–Inf–2

Surgery patients who are given an antibiotic at the right
time (within one hour before surgery) to help prevent
infection.
Surgery patients who are given the right kind of
antibiotic to help prevent infection.

SCIP–Inf–3

Surgery patients whose preventive antibiotics are stopped
at the right time (within 24 hours after surgery).

SCIP–Inf–4

Heart surgery patients whose blood sugar (blood glucose)
is kept under good control in the days right after surgery.

SCIP–Inf–1

SCIP–Inf–9
(Added for
FY14)

Surgery patients whose urinary catheters were removed
on the first or second day after surgery.
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Mortality Measures
Acute Myocardial
MORT-30Infarction (AMI) 30AMI
day mortality rate.
MORT-30- Heart Failure (HF) 30HF
day mortality rate.
MORT-30- Pneumonia (PN) 30PN
day mortality rate.

PSI 03
PSI 06
PSI 07
PSI 08
PSI 12
PSI 13
PSI 14
PSI 15

PSI-90

Pressure Ulcer Rate
Iatrogenic Pneumothorax Rate
Central Venous Catheter-Related Bloodstream Infection Rate
Postoperative Hip Fracture Rate
Postoperative Pulmonary Embolism or Deep Vein Thrombosis Rate
Postoperative Sepsis Rate
Postoperative Wound Dehiscence Rate
Accidental Puncture or Laceration Rate
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Measurement Periods and Relative Weights
Fiscal
Year

Patient
Experience

FY13

July 1,
2011March 31,
2012

FY14

FY15

April 1,
2012December
31, 2012
January 1,
2014December
31, 2014

Percent
of TPS
30%

30%

30%

Process
Measures
July 1,
2011March 31,
2012
April 1,
2012December
31, 2012
January 1,
2014December
31, 2014

Percent
of TPS

Outcome
Measures

Percent
of TPS

Efficiency
Measure

Percent
of TPS

70%

NA

NA

NA

NA

45%

Mortality July 1,
2011- June 30,
2012

25%

NA

NA

20%

Mortality and
AHRQ: October
15, 2012 to June
30, 2013;
CLABSI:
February 1, 2013December 31,
2013

30%

May 1,
2013 to
December
31, 2013

20%
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Remote Hospitals Ranked by Years of HVBP Participation and State
Name
City
State Travel Distance Beds
Time
(Miles)
(Minutes)
Fairbanks Memorial
Fairbanks
AK 479.85
312.51
118
Hospital
Bartlett Regional
Juneau
AK 334.29
165.97
45
Hospital
Central Peninsula
Soldotna
AK 281.73
140.15
46
General Hospital
Baxter Regional Medical
Mountain
AR
61.50
47.81
160
Center
Home
North Arkansas Regional
Harrison
AR
60.41
47.81
112
Medical Center
Yuma Regional Medical
Yuma
AZ 153.48
151.11
406
Center
Havasu Regional
Lake Havasu AZ
62.41
51.88
162
Medical Center
City
Sierra Vista Regional
Sierra Vista
AZ
77.29
68.54
88
Health Center
Flagstaff Medical Center
Flagstaff
AZ
76.99
48.94
245
Kingman Regional
Kingman
AZ
60.99
38.71
196
Medical Center
Payson Regional Medical
Payson
AZ 101.80
66.94
37
Center
Ukiah Valley Medical
Ukiah
CA
70.77
56.37
45
Center/Hospital D
Palo Verde Hospital
Blythe
CA
90.44
87.64
51
Barton Memorial
South Lake
CA
74.26
55.21
63
Hospital
Tahoe
Sutter Coast Hospital
Crescent City CA
94.11
72.82
49
San Luis Valley Regional
Alamosa
CO 121.07
115.82
47
Medical Center
Arkansas Valley
La Junta
CO
82.15
62.82
53
Regional Medical Center
Yampa Valley Medical
Steamboat
CO 106.78
87.93
36
Center
Springs
Lower Keys Medical
Key West
FL
169.20
122.81
135
Center
Doctor's Memorial
Perry
FL
69.56
49.51
44

Particip
ation
(Years)
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
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Hospital Inc.
Hilo Medical Center
Hilo
North Hawaii
Kamuela
Community Hospital
Wilcox Memorial
Lihue
Hospital
St Anthony Regional
Carroll
Hospital & Nursing
Home
Ottumwa Regional
Ottumwa
Health Center
Mercy Medical CenterMason City
North Iowa
Trinity Regional Medical Fort Dodge
Center
St Joseph Regional
Lewiston
Medical Center
St Luke's Magic Valley
Twin Falls
RMC
Blessing Hospital
Quincy
Hays Medical Center
Hays
Western Plains Medical
Dodge City
Complex
Alpena Regional Medical
Alpena
Center
Marquette General
Marquette
Hospital
Chippewa County War
Sault Sainte
Memorial Hospital
Marie
Dickinson County
Iron
Memorial Hospital
Mountain
Munson Medical Center Traverse City
Portage Health
Hancock
Sanford Worthington
Worthington
Medical Center
Essentia Health St
Detroit Lakes
Joseph's Medical Center
Mayo Clinic Health
Fairmont
System- Fairmont
Hannibal Regional
Hannibal

HI
HI

79.10
63.77

58.59
47.19

142
33

3
3

HI

NA

NA

72

3

IA

73.38

58.24

50

3

IA

73.41

58.08

85

3

IA

87.49

72.18

185

3

IA

73.50

58.24

103

3

ID

130.57

112.39

99

3

ID

116.13

115.10

158

3

IL
KS
KS

88.56
65.85
61.55

64.39
58.02
51.52

169
106
56

3
3
3

MI

76.64

63.20

92

3

MI

98.23

78.01

210

3

MI

105.02

89.89

80

3

MI

96.94

78.01

91

3

MI
MI
MN

64.90
132.12
66.25

45.16
94.39
58.11

349
34
45

3
3
3

MN

72.93

59.64

137

3

MN

60.80

51.46

56

3

MO

68.70

54.57

87

3
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Hospital
Northeast Regional
Medical Center
St James Healthcare
Northern Montana
Hospital
St Peter's Hospital
Bozeman Deaconess
Hospital
Murphy Medical Center
Inc.
Altru Hospital
Trinity Hospitals
Great Plains Regional
Medical Center
Regional West Medical
Center
Mary Hitchcock
Memorial Hospital
Cheshire Medical Center
Northern Navajo Medical
Center
Lea Regional Medical
Center
Gila Regional Medical
Center
Alta Vista Regional
Hospital
Northeastern Nevada
Regional Hospital
Banner Churchill
Community Hospital
Champlain Valley
Physicians Hospital
Medical Center
McCurtain Memorial
Hospital
Bay Area Hospital
Sky Lakes Medical
Center

Kirksville

MO

64.41

55.18

103

3

Butte
Havre

MT
MT

70.68
108.53

65.68
109.24

83
210

3
3

Helena
Bozeman

MT
MT

65.46
97.56

65.68
84.53

101
81

3
3

Murphy

NC

78.11

56.67

54

3

Grand Forks
Minot
North Platte

ND
ND
NE

77.72
130.00
106.87

74.03
102.15
93.51

216
202
68

3
3
3

Scottsbluff

NE

182.13

168.87

118

3

Lebanon

NH

68.20

55.06

352

3

Keene
Shiprock

NH
NM

60.14
60.44

47.35
30.96

92
59

3
3

Hobbs

NM

84.86

71.68

141

3

Silver City

NM

116.57

109.25

56

3

Las Vegas

NM

64.02

62.96

44

3

Elko

NV

248.13

247.24

61

3

Fallon

NV

64.88

55.48

39

3

Plattsburgh

NY

60.06

48.18

287

3

Idabel

OK

60.05

42.90

75

3

Coos Bay
Klamath
Falls

OR
OR

131.98
85.57

84.36
64.56

172
98

3
3
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Mid Columbia Hospital
The Dalles
St Alphonsus Medical
Ontario
Center
Mercy Medical Center
Roseburg
Soldiers And Sailors
Wellsboro
Memorial Hospital
Avera St Mary's Hospital
Pierre
Avera Queen Of Peace
Mitchell
Brownwood Regional
Brownwood
Medical Center
Childress Regional
Childress
Medical Center
Castleview Hospital
Price
Riverside Shore
Nassawadox
Memorial Hospital
Lewisgale Hospital
Low Moor
Alleghany
Rutland Regional
Rutland
Medical Center
Central Vermont Medical
Barre
Center
Grays Harbor
Aberdeen
Community Hospital
Samaritan Hospital
Moses Lake
Olympic Medical Center Port Angeles
Bay Area Med Ctr
Marinette
Summersville Regional Summersville
Medical Center
Camden Clark Medical
Parkersburg
Center
Berkeley Medical Center Martinsburg
Memorial Hospital
Rock Springs
Sweetwater County
Ivinson Memorial
Laramie
Hospital
Cheyenne Regional
Cheyenne
Medical Center
Campbell County
Gillette
Memorial Hospital
St Johns Medical Center
Jackson

OR
OR

74.56
262.70

69.19
250.08

43
46

3
3

OR
PA

75.65
62.64

65.80
46.98

139
63

3
3

SD
SD
TX

101.81
78.38
64.82

80.12
66.10
56.83

60
88
117

3
3
3

TX

70.47

67.52

37

3

UT
VA

81.09
75.06

69.87
50.25

49
127

3
3

VA

71.70

45.29

87

3

VT

64.47

53.64

90

3

VT

60.79

42.79

64

3

WA

65.35

46.02

105

3

WA
WA
WI
WV

78.65
95.28
76.75
67.15

65.53
66.65
51.50
43.87

49
78
95
40

3
3
3
3

WV

62.63

47.33

300

3

WV
WY

153.37
92.67

136.18
98.43

146
58

3
3

WY

71.08

45.77

66

3

WY

71.02

45.77

170

3

WY

97.16

100.17

66

3

WY

182.38

156.82

46

3
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Wyoming Medical
Casper
Center
Mena Regional Health
Mena
System
Fort Defiance Indian
Fort Defiance
Hospital
Tuba City Regional
Tuba City
Health Care Corporation
Mt Graham Regional
Safford
Medical Center
Valley View Hospital
Glenwood
Association
Springs
Kona Community
Kealakekua
Hospital
Southwest Medical
Liberal
Center
George County Hospital
Lucedale
Siouxland Surgery
Dakota
Center Lp.
Dunes
Evanston Regional
Evanston
Hospital
Yukon Kuskokwim Delta
Bethel
Reg Hospital
Chinle Comprehensive
Chinle
Health Care Facility
Memorial Hospital Of
Guymon
Texas County
Pecos County Memorial Fort Stockton
Hospital
Sevier Valley Medical
Richfield
Center
Sheridan Memorial
Sheridan
Hospital
Mt Edgecumbe Hospital
Sitka
San Carlos Indian
San Carlos
Hospital
Sells Indian Health
Sells
Service Hospital
Keefe Memorial Hospital
Cheyenne
Wells

WY

121.78

118.54

169

3

AR

84.78

71.80

39

2

AZ

154.50

51.79

50

2

AZ

115.80

72.78

70

2

AZ

119.15

63.22

45

2

CO

72.57

59.82

47

2

HI

62.67

47.19

65

2

KS

66.83

56.21

64

2

MS
SD

64.14
66.94

38.49
56.41

36
40

2
2

WY

104.62

98.43

31

2

AK

NA

NA

34

1

AZ

163.64

51.79

60

1

OK

120.12

111.17

45

1

TX

83.11

80.06

26

1

UT

66.04

58.55

26

1

WY

110.69

100.17

66

1

AK
AZ

334.29
119.53

165.97
63.22

26
8

0
0

AZ

64.38

57.72

14

0

CO

125.97

108.72

10

0
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Bob Wilson Memorial
Grant County Hospital
Morton County Hospital
Garrett County Memorial
Hospital
Western Maryland
Regional Medical Center
Southeast Health Center
Of Reynolds County
PHS Indian Hospital At
Browning
PHS Indian Hosp At
Belcourt
Standing Rock Indian
Health Service Hospital
Crownpoint Healthcare
Facility
DHHS US PHS Indian
Health Services
Guadalupe County
Hospital
Nye Regional Medical
Center
South Lyon Medical
Center
Share Memorial Hospital
PHS Indian Hospital At
Eagle Butte
PHS Indian Hospital At
Pine Ridge
PHS Indian Hospital At
Rosebud

Ulysses

KS

60.39

49.19

20

0

Elkhart
Oakland

KS
MD

73.20
64.75

56.21
47.54

27
26

0
0

Cumberland

MD

64.97

47.54

200

0

Ellington

MO

65.08

50.95

21

0

Browning

MT

144.26

97.84

27

0

Belcourt

ND

118.54

102.15

27

0

Fort Yates

ND

103.58

65.23

12

0

Crownpoint

NM

114.14

62.11

25

0

San Fidel

NM

65.49

57.45

7

0

Santa Rosa

NM

95.75

62.96

10

0

Tonopah

NV

155.09

156.67

10

0

Yerington

NV

64.66

57.77

14

0

Alva
Eagle Butte

OK
SD

73.52
155.06

63.16
80.12

36
8

0
0

Pine Ridge

SD

104.28

78.32

45

0

Rosebud

SD

103.88

100.56

35

0

